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BACKDOOR EUGENICS: THE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS 
OF CERTAIN DAMAGES AWARDS IN WRONGFUL BIRTH AND 
WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIMS 
Jillian T. Stein∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wrongful birth and wrongful life actions are unlike other pre-
natal torts because of such lawsuits’ discriminatory treatment of the 
disabled.  When a state recognizes such causes of action without limi-
tation or restrictions on damages awards, the state is engaging in eu-
genics.
1
  In other prenatal torts, such as prenatal-injury tort actions
2
 
and wrongful pregnancy (i.e., wrongful conception),
3
 value judg-
ments are not made by the courts.  When a state recognizes prenatal-
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 1 Generally, “eugenics” is defined as “a science that deals with the improvement 
(as by control of human mating) of hereditary qualities of a race or breed,” MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 399 (10th ed. 1998), or “[t]he improvement of 
the race by scientific controls, based on study of hereditary factors.”  BALLENTINE’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 423 (3d ed. 1969); see also GERRY W. BEYER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, 
MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 297 (2d ed. 1996) (defining eugenics 
as the “[d]eliberate manipulation of reproduction with the purpose of creating supe-
rior offspring”); infra Part IV. 
 2 In prenatal-injury torts, the doctor’s negligence causes the fetus to suffer some 
harm in utero—that but for the doctor’s negligence, the child would have been born 
“with a sound mind and body.”  Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960).  In 
prenatal-injury tort actions, physicians have been held liable for disabilities caused by 
their negligence connected with the birth itself.  Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 
674–75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).  The wrongful birth tort, however, often involves a 
negligent failure of the physician during the early stages of pregnancy to inform par-
ents of the risks of certain birth defects.  Id. at 675. 
 3 In wrongful pregnancy, the doctor’s negligent failure to detect a pregnancy 
leads to the birth of an unwanted but healthy child.  See Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 676.  
In a wrongful pregnancy suit, when a physician negligently fails to detect a pregnan-
cy, he deprives the mother of an opportunity to terminate the pregnancy at an early 
stage, and “the birth of a healthy, but unwanted, baby results.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
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injury tort actions, the state does not condone the choice that a par-
ent claims that he or she would have made to prevent the birth of a 
disabled child—in prenatal-injury tort actions, “the intermediate step 
of parental action”
4
 is not present.  In wrongful pregnancy actions, 
value judgments are not made about which babies should be born 
but which ones should not.  Granting damages in wrongful pregnan-
cy actions (or wrongful conception actions) for the deprivation of the 
opportunity to not have any child at all does not share the eugenic 
implications of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions in that the 
courts are not making value judgments through the juxtaposition of 
the lives of disabled children with the lives of nondisabled children. 
Courts in wrongful pregnancy actions acknowledge that the par-
ents have lost an opportunity to make an informed decision not to 
have a child.  In wrongful birth and wrongful life cases, however, the 
fact pattern is different.  In wrongful birth cases, courts acknowledge 
not merely the lost opportunity to choose, but consider parents to be 
“damaged” as a result of their lost opportunity to choose, specifically, 
not to have a disabled child.  And in wrongful life actions, courts find 
disabled children to be “damaged” in having been born because had 
the parents been given a choice, the pregnancy would have been ab-
orted and that, allegedly, would be preferable to the disabled child-
ren.  Therefore, by recognizing the torts of wrongful life and wrong-
ful birth, the state condones the value judgments made by parents.  
This condonation has both discriminatory and eugenic implications. 
Discrimination is inherent when a court or legislature chooses to 
allow certain damages awards when the child is disabled (in wrongful 
birth and wrongful life suits)
5
 but disallows the same damages when 
the child is healthy although just as “unwanted” (as in wrongful 
pregnancy and wrongful conception cases).
6
  This is especially true 
when the unwanted birth arises from very similar circumstances—
when the birth arises out of a prenatal-care physician’s negligence 
that deprived the parents of their ability to exercise their right to 
choose.  A finding that a parent has been harmed by having a dis-
 
 4 Id. at 675.  The allegation that the negligence of the physician robbed the par-
ents of their opportunity to terminate the pregnancy is not present in prenatal-injury 
tort actions as it is in wrongful birth.  Id.  Parents in wrongful birth cases have a right 
to an abortion “but argue that the physician’s negligence deprived them of . . . 
[their] right under controlling federal precedent to terminate a pregnancy.”  Id. at 
676. 
 5 See infra Part III.  
 6 See supra note 3. 
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abled child she did not want but not so finding when the parent had 
a healthy child she did not want is, in effect, discriminatory.  Granting 
additional damages to a disabled child in a wrongful-life suit but re-
fusing to grant the same damages when the child is healthy is also in-
herently discriminatory. 
Such discrimination has adverse effects.  Initially, it stigmatizes 
the disabled community by implying that parents and disabled child-
ren are harmed by the deprivation of the free exercise of procreative 
choice when a birth results in a disabled child but not when a birth 
results in a healthy child.  Further, the legal recognition of wrongful 
birth and wrongful life suits will pressure parents to make the deci-
sion not to birth a disabled child and will incentivize prenatal-care 
doctors to advise against the same.
7
 
Although both wrongful birth and wrongful life suits have eu-
genic implications,
8
 this Comment argues that such suits should nev-
ertheless be permitted.  First, parents have a well-recognized right to 
choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.
9
  Second, the law 
would be an instrument of injustice if it left parents and disabled 
children with the heavy burden of medical and other costs incurred 
as a result of the deprivation of the parents’ right to choose when 
that deprivation is the fault of the physician.  The eugenic implica-
tions of these suits could be combated, however, by changing the type 
of damages awarded and limiting the extent to which emotional-
distress damages can be awarded. 
Part II of this Comment describes the right of procreative choice 
and the motivating factors that form the basis of parents’ procreative 
decisions.  The differences between wrongful birth and wrongful life 
causes of actions and the extent to which each tort has been recog-
nized in this country are explained in Part III.  Part IV of this Com-
ment defines eugenics in detail.  The eugenic implications of states 
awarding plaintiffs damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits 
are laid out in Part V.  In Part VI this Comment proposes how states 
can both appreciate the parents’ loss of their right to choose and mi-
tigate the eugenic implications of these causes of action through the 
restriction of damages awards.  This Comment argues that, absent an 
adequate health care system for disabled children and adults, every 
 
 7 See infra Part V.  
 8 See Glenn McGee & David Magnus, Eugenics, Ethics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 199, 203 (Thomas H. Murray & 
Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000).     
 9 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
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state should grant awards of special damages in wrongful birth and 
wrongful life causes of action and limit damages awards for emotional 
distress.  This Comment also proposes that, even if a proper health 
care system were in place, the wrongful birth tort should be main-
tained and nominal damages should be awarded in recognition of 
the resultant injury to parents when a negligent physician deprives 
them of the opportunity to exercise their right to terminate a preg-
nancy.  This Comment concludes that wrongful birth and wrongful 
life suits should thus be remedied to prevent a new eugenics era and 
ensure that history does not repeat itself in a profoundly negative 
way. 
II. MAKING CHOICES 
A. The Right to Procreative Choice 
The right to choose whether to conceive or to terminate a preg-
nancy, or even to avoid the birth of a disabled child, is grounded in 
the right of privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which protects every person’s right to liberty.
10
  Every 
fundamental right that comprises the broad right to privacy is consti-
tutionally protected from invasion by the states.
11
  The right to liberty 
protects a person’s decisions from unjustified interference by the 
government.
12
  Such decisions include personal decisions relating to 
procreation.
13
  The Supreme Court of the United States has intimated 
that the right to procreative autonomy is constitutionally protected 
even though it is “not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, [is] 
not intended by the framers, and [is] not part of tradition stated at 
the most specific level of abstraction.”
14
  What must logically follow 
 
 10 In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court of the United States arti-
culated that procreative autonomy is part of a right of privacy.  See 381 U.S. 479, 484–
85 (1965).  Originally, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, express-
ly rejected the contention that the right to privacy was protected in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 480–82.  Instead, Justice Douglas 
found the right of privacy in the penumbras of the guarantees specified in the Bill of 
Rights.  See id. at 484–85.  Subsequent decisions, however, have placed the right of 
privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 11 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–47. 
 12 See id. at 859. 
 13 Id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
 14 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 827 (3d ed. 
2006). 
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from the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutio-
nality of a woman’s decision to have an abortion
15
 is the acknowledg-
ment of “‘the right to submit to a procedure designed to give infor-
mation about that fetus which can then lead to a decision to abort.’”
16
  
Arguably, however, choosing and selecting the characteristics and 
genetic makeup of a child should not be considered an entitlement 
in light of the eugenic implications in making such choices. 
Possibly, a person’s access to prenatal screening and abortions 
should be limited because the use of these procedures may lead to 
the eradication of one particular group of people—genetically im-
paired individuals.
17
  In a democratic government, however, the 
“democratic presumption”
18
 provides that government should not in-
terfere with a person’s freedom absent sufficient justification.
19
  The 
presumption is that every person should be able to live as he or she 
may choose based on one’s own moral code and values regardless of 
whether such choices and values are mainstream.
20
  The freedom to 
do something cannot be limited to the freedom to do what is agreea-
ble to everyone.  Reproductive freedom is most important when it is 
the freedom to do what is disagreeable to others;
21
 otherwise that 
freedom is meaningless.  Only when a person’s choice poses serious 
danger to someone else or to society should the state intercede and 
limit this freedom of choice.
22
  Anything that falls short of this justifi-
cation for interference will kill liberty.
23
 
Although some risks of harm may warrant interference with pro-
creative choice, whether the risk of stigma to the disabled community 
warrants such interference is not so clear.  Proponents of the demo-
 
 15 In 1973 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, con-
cluded that the “right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, 
or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnan-
cy.”  410 U.S. at 153. 
 16 LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT GENETICS 58 
(2001) (quoting Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff’d 
without opinion sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990)).  
 17 See JOHN HARRIS, ENHANCING EVOLUTION: THE ETHICAL CASE FOR MAKING BETTER 
PEOPLE 72 (2007).   
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 76. 
 22 Id. at 72.   
 23 HARRIS, supra note 17, at 72.   
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cratic presumption argue that to rebut this presumption, the risks of 
harm must be “real and present, not future and speculative.”
24
  If the 
risks are speculative in nature, “the presumption in favor of liberty 
would be at risk whenever imaginative tyrants could postulate possi-
ble, but highly unlikely, future harms.”
25
  The risk of stigma to and 
the elimination of persons with genetic disabilities is not speculative, 
but rather is a very real and likely harm.
26
  Nevertheless, the right to 
choose whether to have a child is afforded strong protection. 
The mere exercise of personal preference
27
 is distinguishable 
from the right to reproductive liberty and procreative autonomy.
28
  
Consequently, the former does not deserve as much protection as the 
latter: 
If freedom to choose [a good] is simply something that we all 
want, like air conditioning or lobsters, then we are not entitled to 
hang on to these freedoms in the face of what we concede to be 
the rights of others to an equal share of respect and resources.
29
 
By contrast, courts protect a person’s right to reproductive liberty 
and procreative autonomy.  The person deprived of the right to 
choose may seek legal redress against the negligent tortfeasor.  
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits are two avenues of such relief. 
B. Why Some Parents Make Choices 
Child-rearing is one of the biggest challenges that many adults 
face.  A parent has to make many sacrifices and invest much into a 
child’s well-being.  A new baby requires many years of dedication by 
its parents to foster the child’s life, protect her from life’s difficulties, 
and provide her every advantage that the parents can afford.
30
  Some 
parents attempt to achieve these goals by taking certain steps before 
the baby is even born—at conception or even earlier.  While it is still 
impossible to select which of our inheritable traits children should 
 
 24 Id. at 74. 
 25 Id.  
 26 See infra Part V.  For statistics on how many parents choose to abort when they 
discover that their fetus may be disabled, see infra note 34. 
 27 HARRIS, supra note 17, at 75. 
 28 See id.  
 29 Id. (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 267 (1977)) (altera-
tion in original). 
 30 Jeffrey R. Botkin, Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of Medicine: 
Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 265, 265 (2003).  
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have, thanks to advances in prenatal screening and genetic testing,
31
 
parents can still choose to accept a fetus that has already been con-
ceived, abort it, or choose not to conceive at all.
32
 
Reproductive genetic testing leads some prospective parents to 
decide to prevent either a pregnancy or a birth.
33
  In some circums-
tances, this decision may be based upon a parent’s desire to avoid 
having children who suffer from a genetic disease or condition.
34
  Ad-
vances in medical science have even expanded prenatal testing to 
late-onset disorders, such as breast cancer, and to characteristics like 
homosexuality.
35
 
Since the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to 
have an abortion in Roe v. Wade,
36
 the concept of “every-child-a-
wanted child”
37
 has altered societal views and has “elevated the rejec-
tion of imperfect children [via abortions] to an enlightened choice.”
38
  
Society has started to view with disdain those parents who, armed with 
information that the child will likely be disabled, still choose to have 
 
 31 McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 201 (“Amniocentesis, ultrasonography, and 
chronic villus sampling (CVS) [make] it possible to look into the womb to check on 
a fetus’s condition.”). 
 32 Botkin, supra note 30, at 265. 
 33 LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 300 (2d ed. 2006).   
 34 Id.  As many as eighty or ninety percent of women choose to have an abortion 
after finding out that they are pregnant with a child who has Down’s syndrome, 
which, like other genetic diseases, is tested by amniocentesis.  Christine Rosen, Taste: 
A Life Worth Living, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at W11; see also George Neumayr, The 
New Eugenics, AM. SPECTATOR, July 13, 2005, at 1, available at http://spectator.org/ 
archives/2005/07/13/the-new-eugenics; Philip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization 
Laws, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
204, 213 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000) (“[W]idespread use 
of prenatal screening coupled with selective abortion is causing a significant decline 
in the number of children born with Down syndrome.”).  “Amniocentesis” is a type 
of prenatal screening whereby the amniotic fluid is withdrawn from the amniotic sac 
and analyzed.  ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 59.  A high percentage of fetuses that have 
tested positive for cystic fibrosis are also being aborted.  Neumayr, supra, at 1. 
 35 Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS 
L.J. 967, 970 (1996).  Other detectable genetic disorders in addition to Down’s syn-
drome include Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, pseudohypertrophic muscular dy-
strophy, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, and sickle cell anemia.  The Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal Genetic Testing, 3 
ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 633, 635 (1994), available at http://archfami.ama-assn.org/cgi/ 
reprint/3/7/633.pdf.   
 36 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
 37 George Neumayr, The Perfect Child, AM. SPECTATOR, May 5, 2005, at 1, available 
at http://spectator.org/archives/2005/05/05/the-perfect-child.   
 38 Id. 
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that child.
39
  Some doctors may choose to encourage prenatal genetic 
screening so that parents have sufficient information to engage in 
“responsible parenthood,” which arguably includes a parent’s respon-
sibility to not knowingly transmit defects to offspring.
40
  Margery 
Shaw, a geneticist and attorney, goes further—she argues that to 
knowingly transmit genetic defects to one’s child would be akin to 
child abuse.
41
  “[C]hoice and prevention [have, evidently, begun to] 
produce a culture that equates disability with irresponsible parenting 
decisions.”
42
 
The result is peer pressure on parents to abort a child whom 
they have reason to believe may be disabled.
43
  Today, parents who 
could have prevented the birth of a disabled child either by not con-
ceiving or by aborting are asked to justify their actions—why have a 
disabled child when the opportunity not to exists?
44
  Prenatal screen-
ing and the option to abort a fetus upon learning of its defects 
(coupled with social pressures to have healthy children and possible 
pressures from the doctor to have an abortion to avoid future liabili-
ty)
45
 lead parents who would not have otherwise aborted a fetus to 
choose that route. 
In the future, parents opting not to birth a disabled child will 
likely increase.  Modern biotechnology will enlarge the array of ge-
netic testing that can be performed on a person before conception 
and during pregnancy to determine the likelihood of having a dis-
abled child.  Additionally, more people will choose to prevent the 
 
 39 Neumayr, supra note 34, at 2. 
 40 Paul Ramsey, Screening: An Ethicist’s View, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS: 
GENETIC COUNSELING AND THE USE OF GENETIC KNOWLEDGE 147, 150 (Bruce Hilton et 
al. eds., 1973). 
 41 Botkin, supra note 30, at 272. 
 42 Rosen, supra note 34. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 The recognition of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits “will place increased 
pressure upon physicians to take the ‘safe’ course by recommending abortion” to 
avoid future liability.  Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1985).  The 
Azzolino court indicated that this pressure is best illustrated by this story: 
A clinical instructor asks his students to advise an expectant mother on 
the fate of a fetus whose father has chronic syphilis.  Early siblings were 
born with a collection of defects such as deafness, blindness, and re-
tardation.  The usual response of the students is: “Abort!”  The teacher 
then calmly replies: “Congratulations, you have just aborted Beetho-
ven.” 
Id. (citation omitted).  
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birth of a disabled child if given the opportunity, in large part due to 
pure ability to make such choices and because of the social pressures 
and financial costs of rearing a disabled child. 
Although many parents can cope with the birth of a disabled 
child, the fact is the path is a difficult one and is sufficiently demand-
ing that many people may choose to avoid this kind of challenge.
46
  
Some parents can love and support a disabled child without a nega-
tive impact on their marriage or family.
47
  There are others, however, 
who cannot.  Time, energy, and sacrifices are needed to successfully 
cope with a child’s disability.
48
  In addition, financial resources are 
required to deal with the expenses of raising a child with a disability.
49
  
Therefore, parents might choose not to have a genetically impaired 
child to avoid the prohibitive financial costs incurred in raising a 
child with a severe genetic disease.
50
  Ultimately, “economic and social 
pressures may create situations where reproductive decision making 
is constrained as if the situation were legislated.”
51
  A lack of econom-
ic security, insurance, or social support could determine whether 
parents will choose to prevent the birth of children at risk for a genet-
ic disorder.
52
  The financial concerns, however, could be allayed by 
proper health care coverage. 
C. An Insufficient Health Care System 
The financial burden on parents to care for disabled children is 
no small consideration.
53
  First, many health insurers refuse to cover 
 
 46 Botkin, supra note 30, at 290. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Cf. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 637 (“[L]ack 
of social and economic support for the disabled might dissuade parents who would 
otherwise bear and raise an affected child from choosing to reproduce.”); see also in-
fra Part II.C. 
 51 McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 202. 
 52 See id. 
 53 Paul T. Shattuck & Susan L. Parish, Financial Burden in Families of Children with 
Special Health Care Needs: Variability Among States, 122 PEDIATRICS 13, 13–14 (2008), 
available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/122/1/13 (“The costs of 
caring for children with special health care needs (CSHCN) are high, relative to 
those for typically developing children, because of elevated requirements for both 
primary and specialty medical care, as well as therapeutic and supportive services 
such as rehabilitation, environmental adaptations, assistive devices, personal assis-
tance, and mental health, home health, and respite care. . . . [M]ean direct out-of-
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the costs of necessary treatments for certain disorders.
54
  Certain 
plans do not cover needed items, such as special formulas and foods, 
neurodevelopmental assessments, and therapies for children.
55
  Many 
managed-care plans have restrictions as to what professionals may be 
consulted (only in-network professionals, for example) and whether 
specialized services may be used.
56
  Sometimes, the in-network doctors 
lack sufficient expertise to deal with the problems that some of these 
children face.
57
  For complex disorders, children should be treated by 
a team of doctors in several disciplines and various areas of exper-
tise.
58
  Yet getting such a team of doctors together often proves prohi-
bitive and beyond the boundaries of private insurance coverage.
59
  
Thus, the inadequacy of insurance coverage and insufficient access to 
the most qualified doctors prevent many disabled children from re-
ceiving optimal care.
60
  Moreover, some children have neither any 
health care coverage at all nor the means to pay for necessary treat-
ments.
61
 
Second, having “a child with a significant disability can have an 
adverse effect on the parents in terms of heartache, worry, time, ef-
fort, and money.”
62
  Therefore, aside from the strain on their pockets 
due to insufficient health care coverage of their disabled children, 
parents may also have to contend with insufficient funding for psy-
chological and support services for themselves and other family 
 
pocket expenditures for families with CSHCN were more than twice the mean for 
families with nondisabled children.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 54 See, e.g., AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, American Academy of Pediatrics, 
Newborn Screening: A Blueprint for the Future: A Call for a National Agenda on State New-
born Screening Programs, 106 PEDIATRICS 389, 390 (2000), available at  
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/106/2/S1/389 (discussing treat-
ment for phenylketonuria); AZ AUTISM INSURANCE, AUTISM SPEAKS: ARGUMENTS IN 
SUPPORT OF PRIVATE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF AUTISM-RELATED SERVICES 4 (2007),  
http://www.azautisminsurance.org/files/Arguments%20for%20private%20insuranc
e%20coverage%20-%20Autism%20Speaks.pdf  (“Most insurance policies contain 
specific exclusions for autism . . . , [thus] families must pay for costly treatments out-
of-pocket or forego them.”).   
 55 AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 422. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 422. 
 62 Botkin, supra note 30, at 290. 
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members.
63
  Of course, the parents’ interest to be free from these ad-
verse consequences diminishes as the severity of the child’s congenit-
al condition decreases.
64
 
In addition, despite the provisions in the Health Insurance Por-
tability and Accountability Act, no significant health care coverage is 
available for infants.
65
  Likewise, state mandates that require private 
insurance benefit packages to include items such as formula or nutri-
tional supplements to meet the needs of sick children do not apply to 
self-funded employer-based benefit plans.
66
  This means that twenty-
five to fifty percent of individuals covered under such plans will not 
be protected by the state mandates regarding insurance benefits.
67
  
Furthermore, although federal law guarantees Medicaid coverage to 
newborns for the first year of their lives, many states lack effective 
measures for the implementation of these guarantees.
68
  In five states, 
the insurance benefit packages under non-Medicaid State Children’s 
Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP) exclude coverage for the costs 
of hearing aids, some medical equipment and other devices, and 
therapies for certain developmental conditions or chronic conditions 
that are not expected to improve over time.
69
 
While the aforementioned limitations on health care coverage 
pertain only to disabled infants and children and their parents, the 
problems with health care coverage persist into the disabled child’s 
adult life as well.  For many disabled persons, in fact, the problem is 
exacerbated when they become adults because they no longer qualify 
for Medicaid, SCHIP, and other publicly funded programs.
70
 
At least one state, California, has recognized how the lack of fi-
nancial means to care for a disabled person may persuade parents to 
avoid the birth of a disabled child.
71
  In Turpin v. Sortini, the Supreme 
Court of California discussed California’s wrongful life statute,
72
 
which permits a cause of action to be brought against physicians but 
 
 63 AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 422. 
 64 Botkin, supra note 30, at 290. 
 65 AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 421. 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 422. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Id. 
 71 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 959 (Cal. 1982). 
 72 See id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 2007).   
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not parents.
73
  The court indicated that that history “suggest[s] that 
the purpose of the legislation was simply to eliminate any liability or 
other similar economic pressure which might induce potential par-
ents to abort or decline to conceive a potentially defective child.”
74
  
Evidently, the concern that parents might be pressured into aborting 
disabled children solely on the basis of financial considerations was so 
compelling that the state was moved to take statutory action; Califor-
nia wanted to ensure that disabled children could never sue their 
parents for giving birth to them notwithstanding the opportunity to 
abort or avoid conception.  But California, and all other jurisdictions, 
should go even further to eliminate the economic pressures on “par-
ents to abort or decline to conceive a potentially defective child”
75
 by 
enacting legislation that provides sufficient health care coverage to 
children born with genetic defects. 
D. Summary 
Parents, armed with the right to procreative autonomy, are free 
to choose whether to have a disabled child without interference from 
the state.  How that choice is made is based upon many factors, one 
of which is exorbitant health care costs for the disabled individual.  
With proper health care coverage, however, this critical factor could 
be eliminated; some parents, comforted by the knowledge that their 
wallets are adequately protected, may choose to proceed with a preg-
nancy despite the risks of having a disabled child. 
III. LEGAL REDRESS WHEN PARENTS HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR 
RIGHT TO CHOOSE: THE RISE OF WRONGFUL BIRTH AND  
WRONGFUL LIFE TORTS 
Usually, in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits, the negligence 
of a prenatal-care physician has led to the birth of a disabled child—a 
child that allegedly would not have been born at all if the doctor had 
properly warned the parents of the risks.  For example, an obstetri-
cian might negligently fail to advise a thirty-eight-year-old woman in 
the early stages of pregnancy of the increased risk of a woman that 
age bearing a child with Down’s syndrome and fail to offer prenatal 
 
 73 See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 959. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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testing for this disease
76
 (a technique which has been available to 
pregnant women for over two decades).
77
  In the event that the thirty-
eight-year-old woman gives birth to a child with Down’s syndrome,
78
 
her obstetrician may be liable to the mother and/or the child—
depending on the jurisdiction
79
—for failing to warn of the increased 
risk and discuss available prenatal screening. 
A. The Claims Made in Each Cause of Action 
While both wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action 
arise out of the same set of facts, the claims are slightly different.  
“Wrongful birth” is a cause of action whereby the parents of a dis-
abled child sue their prenatal-care physician for precluding the par-
ents from making an informed family-planning decision by not dis-
closing to them either (i) the risk of inheritability of the condition at 
conception
80
 or (ii) whether the fetus, if already conceived, might be 
disabled.  For instance, if a doctor negligently interprets the results of 
a prenatal screening, the parents can sue the doctor in a wrongful 
birth action for not informing them that their fetus is disabled.
81
  The 
wrongful birth action allows the parents to seek damages resulting 
from having to raise a disabled child, which they would have aborted 
but for the doctor’s negligence.
82
  Similarly, in a “wrongful life” suit, 
the disabled child sues the negligent physician for damages he or she 
has suffered from having been born.
83
  The child argues that but for 
 
 76 Cf. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808–09 (N.Y. 1978).  In Becker, a thirty-
seven-year-old pregnant mother was “never advised by [doctors] of the increased risk 
of Down’s Syndrome in children born to women over 35 years of age.  Nor [was she] 
advised . . . of the availability of an amniocentesis test to determine whether the fetus 
. . . would be born afflicted with Down’s Syndrome.”  Id.  (footnote omitted).   
 77 Botkin, supra note 30, at 266. 
 78 Cf. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 11 (Minn. 1986) (not-
ing that at the time the mother became pregnant, she was thirty-four years old, and 
she alleged that her treating physician did not offer her the option of testing for 
Down’s syndrome despite the increased risk of a thirty-five-year-old woman bearing a 
Down’s syndrome child). 
 79 See infra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.   
 80 ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 58. 
 81 Id.   
 82 Neumayr, supra note 34, at 2.  
 83 Id.  Maine characterizes the injury in wrongful life suits as “not life itself but 
rather having to live with a disease or defect.”  Anastosopoulos v. Perakis, No. CV-91-
313, 1995 Me. Super. LEXIS 504, at *17 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 1995). 
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the physician’s negligence, he or she would never have been born 
and forced to live a life of pain and suffering.
84
 
Furthermore, it is prudent to note the distinction between the 
injuries that are claimed in wrongful birth and wrongful life actions 
versus other prenatal tort actions.  In wrongful birth and wrongful 
life suits, the doctor’s negligence led to the birth of a disabled child—
a child that allegedly would not have been born at all if the doctor 
had properly warned the parents.  This is quite distinguishable from 
the prenatal-injury tort where the doctor’s negligence causes the fe-
tus to suffer some harm in utero—but for the doctor’s negligence, the 
child would have been born “with a sound mind and body.”
85
  The 
claimed loss in the wrongful birth tort is lost opportunity—the par-
ents’ opportunity to make an informed decision and their opportuni-
ty to choose to not have a particular child.
86
  Courts that have recog-
nized a cause of action for wrongful birth focus on this lost 
opportunity: “As the wrongful birth decisions recognize, when a doc-
tor or other medical care provider negligently fails to diagnose an 
[sic] hereditary problem, parents are deprived of the opportunity to 
make an informed and meaningful decision whether to conceive and 
bear a handicapped child.”
87
  It is also possible that the birth of an 
unwanted disabled child, who generally requires a greater parental 
investment of time, effort, and money than a healthy child, may im-
pinge on parents’ opportunity to have other children in the future—
this is further lost opportunity.
88
 
 
 84 Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 494 (Wash. 1983). 
 85 Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960).  In prenatal-injury tort ac-
tions, physicians have been held liable for disabilities caused by their negligence 
connected with the birth itself.  Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 674–75 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1999).  The wrongful birth tort, however, often involves a negligent failure 
during the early stages of pregnancy to inform parents of the risks of certain birth 
defects.  Id. at 675. 
 86 Prenatal-injury tort actions, unlike wrongful birth actions, do not involve “the 
intermediate step of parental action.”  Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 675.  The allegation that 
the negligence of the physician robbed the parents of their opportunity to terminate 
the pregnancy is not present in prenatal-injury tort actions as it is in wrongful birth.  
Id.  Parents in wrongful birth cases have this right to an abortion “but argue that the 
physician’s negligence deprived them of . . . [their] right under controlling federal 
precedent to terminate a pregnancy.”  Id. at 676. 
 87 Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982); see also, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 
404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979). 
 88 “Parental Investment (P.I.) is defined as any investment by the parent in [a 
child] that increases [that child]’s chance of surviving . . . at the cost of the parent’s 
ability to invest in other [children].”  RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 124 (30th 
anniversary ed. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[A]ny particular adult 
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B. The Extent to Which Each Cause of Action Has Been Recognized 
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits have not been given the 
same breadth of legal recognition, nor have they been received 
equally by courts and legislatures in the United States.  Of the juris-
dictions in the United States that have considered the issue, a majori-
ty has recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth.
89
  Of those 
states that recognize the wrongful birth tort, most do not allow recov-
ery for emotional distress,
90
 but some do.
91
  Several states, however, 
have declined to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth by 
court decisions: Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, and North 
Carolina.
92
  In addition, some state legislatures have enacted statutes 
 
individual has, in her whole lifetime, a certain total quantity of P.I. [parental invest-
ment] available to invest in children . . . .  This represents the sum of all the food she 
can gather or manufacture in a lifetime of work, all the risks she is prepared to take, 
and all the energy and effort that she is able to put into the welfare of children.”  Id.  
For further discussion on parental investment, see id. at 124–39.   
 89 See Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1031 (Ala. 1993); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 
764 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Colo. 1988); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 886 (D.C. 
App. 1987); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. App. 1981), overruled by 
Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992) (refusing to apply impact doctrine in 
wrongful birth claims but still recognizing wrongful birth claims); Blake v. Cruz, 698 
P.2d 315, 319 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 706 
(Ill. 1987); Arche v. United States, 798 P.2d 477, 481 (Kan. 1990); Pitre v. Opelousas 
Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1162 (La. 1988); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 348 
(N.H. 1986); Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assocs., 844 N.E.2d 
1160, 1168 (Ohio 2006); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1981); Schloss v. 
Miriam Hosp., C.A. No. 98-2076, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 116, at *8 (R.I. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 11, 1999); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v. Burg-
er, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 
(Wash. 1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. 
Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975); see also Becker v. Schwartz, 386 
N.E.2d 807, 811, 813 (N.Y. 1978).  In Becker, the court characterized the cause of ac-
tion for “wrongful birth” as one whereby an “illegitimate, but otherwise healthy child, 
seeks recovery in his or her own behalf for the injury suffered as a consequence of his 
or her birth into this world as a stigmatized child,” which seems to bea mischaracteri-
zation of the tort.  Id.  The court, however, concluded that the parents had a valid 
cause of action in negligence or medical malpractice for pecuniary loss, or special 
damages, “which the parents have borne, and . . . must continue to bear, for the care 
and treatment of their infants,” which by any other name is infact the wrongful birth 
tort.  Id.   
 90 Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993). 
 91 See, e.g., id. at 1030; Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 320 (Idaho 1984); Naccash v. 
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 
494 (Wash. 1983). 
 92 See Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 212 (Ga. 1999); Grubbs v. Barbourville 
Family Health Ctr., P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Ky. 2003); Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 
N.W.2d 670, 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Mo. 
1988); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985).  Missouri also 
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barring actions for wrongful birth.
93
  Over twenty states have declined 
to recognize claims for wrongful life either by the states’ courts
94
 or 
legislatures.
95
  The only states in the United States that recognize a 
wrongful life cause of action are California, Maine, New Jersey, and 
Washington.
96
  New Jersey decided to recognize a wrongful life cause 
 
enacted legislation barring the causes of action for wrongful birth and wrongful life.  
See infra notes 94 and 96.  In Wilson, however, the state judicially declined to recog-
nize these causes of action.  Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 746. 
 93 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-12-1-1 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. and 2009 Special Sess.); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2971(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 2 of 2010 
Legis. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 145.424(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 188.130 (West, Westlaw through 95th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (LEXIS through 2009 Legis. Sess.); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
8305(a) (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (Westlaw through 2009 Legis. of 
84th Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-109 (LEXIS through 2009 1st Special Sess.).   
 94 See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Walker ex rel. Pizano 
v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1210 
(Colo. 1988); Garrison ex rel. Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 293–94 
(Del. 1990); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423–24 (Fla. 1992); Spires v. Kim, 416 
S.E.2d 780, 781–82 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 
N.E.2d 691, 702 (Ill. 1987); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406, 410 (Ill. 1986); 
Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ind. 1991); Bruggeman v. 
Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (Kan. 1986); Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 
P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682, 689–90 (Ky. 2003); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So. 2d 
1019, 1024–25 (La. Ct. App. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 530 So. 2d 1151, 1163 
(La. 1988) (affirming the court of appeal’s judgment that sustained the rejection of 
the wrongful life claim and overruled the rejection of the wrongful birth claim); Kas-
sama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1123 (Md. 2002); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 
12–13 (Mass. 1990); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347–48 (Nev. 1995); Smith 
ex rel. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353–55 (N.H. 1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 
N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985); 
Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1165 (Ohio 2000); Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., C.A. 
No. 98-2076, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 116, at *16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1999); Willis 
v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 71 (S.C. 2004); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924–25 (Tex. 
1984); Glascock v. Laserna, 30 Va. Cir. 366, 369 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993); Barnes v. Head, 
30 Va. Cir. 218, 221–22 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 
(W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1975); 
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 290 (Wyo. 1982).   
 95 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. and 2009 Spe-
cial Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2971(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 2 
of 2010 Legis. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. 
Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West, Westlaw through 95th Gen. Assembly, 1st 
Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (LEXIS through 2009 Legis. Sess.); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (Westlaw 
through 2009 Legis. of 84th Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-109 (LEXIS through 
2009 1st Special Sess.). 
 96 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess 
of 124th Legis.); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 
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of action so that the disabled child could recover the extra expenses 
directly related to the child’s disability and avoid an injustice by rea-
son of the parents’ wrongful birth claim having been barred by the 
statute of limitations.
97
  The recovery in all four of the states that rec-
ognize the tort for wrongful life, however, is limited to only special 
damages (extra medical expenses related to the care of the child).
98
  
Countries other than the United States have also recognized wrong-
ful life claims.
99
 
Most courts that have refused to recognize a cause of action for 
wrongful life have declined to do so for reasons other than eugenic 
implications.
100
  For instance, courts have declined to recognize 
 
A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984), remanded to 502 A.2d 94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985), rev’d on 
other grounds, 543 A.2d 985, 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (dismissing only 
plaintiff’s count of legal malpractice against certain defendants); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).   
 97 Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762. 
 98 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3); Turpin, 643 P.2d at 966; Procanik, 478 
A.2d at 762; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495.    
 99 Although South Africa and most jurisdictions in the world have declined to 
recognize a cause of action for wrongful life, Israel and Holland have recognized this 
cause of action.  Stewart & Another v Botha & Another 2008 (6) SA 310 (SCA) at 316, ¶ 
13 (S. Afr.); see also CA 512/81 Zeitsov v. Katz [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 85; Leids Universi-
tair Medisch Centrum/Kelly Molenaar, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Su-
preme Court of the Netherlands], 18 maart 2005, RvdW 2005, 42 (Neth.).  France’s 
highest appeals court had held that handicapped children can receive compensation 
if their mothers had not been given the opportunity to choose to have an abortion.  
Rod Dreher, French Abort Law Does Nazis Proud, N.Y. POST, July 15, 2001, at 022.  
French courts, however, only recognized this cause of action from 1996 to 2001, be-
cause the political pressure resulted in an act being passed on March 4, 2002, prohi-
biting such claims.  Stewart, (6) SA at 316, ¶ 13. 
 100 Another concern, though one that is beyond the scope of this Comment, 
which has been raised in support of the argument against recognizing a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful life is that recognizing this cause of action may be a half-step to 
permitting a child to sue his or her parent(s) for choosing to conceive despite the 
known risks involved or opting not to terminate a pregnancy despite the positive test 
results.  See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1980) (“If a case arose where, despite due care by the medical profession in transmit-
ting the necessary warnings, parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a 
pregnancy, with full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant would be born . . . we 
see no sound public policy which should protect those parents from being answera-
ble for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought upon their 
offspring.”).  In an Illinois case, however, where the state attorney sued a woman for 
deciding not to have a Cesarean section for religious reasons, the “court held that a 
woman has no duty to guarantee the physical and mental health of her child.”  An-
drews, supra note 35, at 998 (citing In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994)).  A woman should be able to refuse to undergo an abortion or choose to 
have a child despite high risks of conceiving a child with a genetic disease and raise a 
child who may be disabled or sick without a concern that her child will turn around 
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wrongful life claims because “the theory [that the child should not 
have been born at all] amounts to a repudiation of the value of hu-
man life.”
101
  Courts have focused on the preciousness of life and have 
had little discussion (if any) of the negative eugenic implications in 
recognizing this cause of action.
102
 
 
and sue her for having been born.  It would be “inconceivable” that a woman who 
chooses not to avail herself of her right to terminate a pregnancy would be deemed 
to be making an unlawful choice.  Stewart, (6) SA at 316, ¶ 19.  Presumably, if the law 
recognizes a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy as a fundamental one based on 
issues of privacy and autonomy, then these same reasons should substantiate her 
right not to terminate a pregnancy.  See id.  
In further response to this concern—of disabled children suing their parents for 
choosing to continue with the pregnancy despite their knowledge of the disability—
state legislatures can enact provisions to curtail this type of liability.  For instance, the 
California legislature enacted a provision indicating that “[n]o cause of action arises 
against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been 
conceived, or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive.”  
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 2007).  The purpose of enacting this statute was to elim-
inate the fear of liability or any other economic pressure that may induce parents to 
abort or to not conceive a potentially disabled child.  Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 
959 (Cal. 1982). 
 101 Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho 1984); see also Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 
63, 69 (S.C. 2004). 
 102 See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547–48 (Ala. 1978) (declining to rec-
ognize a wrongful life cause of action because it is impossible to calculate damages 
and because there is no legal right not to be born); Willis, 607 S.E.2d at 69–70 (indi-
cating that courts have rejected the wrongful life claim because no legally cognizable 
injury results and for lack of proximate causation).  Some courts have questioned the 
rationale used by other courts in rejecting a cause of action for wrongful life.  For 
example, the Supreme Court of California indicated that it would be “hard to see 
how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering child would ‘dis-
avow’ the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is not entitled to the full 
measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to all members of socie-
ty.”  Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961–62.  The California court, however, entered dangerous 
waters when it indicated that there could be cases where the disability of the child is 
so severe that there could be “societal consensus” that never having been born at all 
is preferable to life.  Id. at 962–63. 
[Where] the plaintiff’s only affliction is deafness, it seems quite unlike-
ly that a jury would ever conclude that life with such a condition is 
worse than not being born at all.  Other wrongful life cases, however, 
have involved children with much more serious, debilitating and pain-
ful conditions, and the academic literature refers to still other, ex-
tremely severe hereditary diseases.  Considering the short life span of 
many of these children and their frequently very limited ability to 
perceive or enjoy the benefits of life, we cannot assert with confidence 
that in every situation there would be a societal consensus that life is 
preferable to never having been born at all. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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C. Summary 
When parents are deprived of their opportunity to choose 
whether to conceive or proceed with a pregnancy of a disabled fetus 
(because of the negligent conduct of a prenatal-care physician), 
many states permit the parents to sue the negligent physician for the 
extraordinary costs they will incur in connection with the rearing of a 
disabled child and sometimes permit the parents to recover for the 
emotional distress they endure as a proximate result of the birth of 
this unwanted disabled child.  Very few states allow the child to sue, 
and those that do only allow recovery for the extra costs the child will 
incur associated with the disability.  A remarkable minority of juris-
dictions that have considered either the wrongful birth or wrongful 
life suit (or both) discussed eugenics despite the eugenic implications 
in the recognition of these suits.
103
 
IV. EUGENICS: A HISTORY 
The question of whether eugenics is a thing of the past or is still 
a part of our culture today depends on how we understand the term 
“eugenics.”
104
  Generally speaking, eugenics “is the ‘science of the im-
provement of the human race by better breeding.’”
105
  The notion 
“that the human race can be gradually improved and social ills simul-
taneously eliminated through a program of selective procreation,”
106
 
is a eugenic premise.  In 1883, Francis Galton, a British naturalist and 
Charles Darwin’s cousin, coined the term “eugenics” from the Greek 
term eugenes, which means “‘good in stock, hereditarily endowed with 
noble qualities.’”
107
  He suggested that we improve the human race 
more “‘quickly and kindly’” than what nature could do by evolution 
“‘blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly.’”
108
  Eugenics promotes the reproduc-
tion of the fit over the unfit and seeks to prevent the birth of the un-
 
 103 For a discussion of the jurisdictions that did touch on eugenics, see infra notes 
166–68 and accompanying text. 
 104 McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 201. 
 105 RUTH CLIFFORD ENGS, THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, at xiii 
(2005). 
 106 Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
 107 See ENGS, supra note 105, at xiii; see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 199; 
Neumayr, supra note 34, at 3. 
 108 Neumayr, supra note 34, at 3.   
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fit.
109
  Positive eugenics is the concept of encouraging those persons 
with more desirable inheritable characteristics to reproduce,
110
 whe-
reas negative eugenics relates to the means by which those persons 
with less desirable traits (e.g., criminals, mentally and physically dis-
abled persons, etc.) are discouraged from reproducing.
111
 
Often the term “eugenics” conjures memories of Hitler’s regime 
and the Nazis’ mass murder of certain designated undesirables, in-
cluding the disabled.
112
  Few may remember the history of this prac-
tice in the United States or know that this country may have inspired 
the Nazis’ own eugenic practices.
113
  In the first half of the twentieth 
century, some societies moved to reduce unwanted populations from 
the general population by sterilization, infanticide, euthanasia, and 
other solutions.
114
 
In the United States, for example, eugenics dates as far back as 
1897.
115
  At the beginning of the twentieth century, eugenics took the 
form of sterilizing the enfeebled.
116
  In most states had laws that per-
mitted the involuntary sterilization of people deemed less fit, which 
resulted in the forced sterilization of at least 60,000 people.
117
  The 
eugenic sterilization programs of the early-twentieth century came 
with public displays at state fairs featuring promotional slogans, such 
as, “Some people are born to be a burden on the rest,” and “Every 15 
seconds $100 of your money goes for the care of persons with bad he-
redity such as the insane feeble-minded, criminals [and] other defec-
 
 109 James E. Bowman, Genetics and the Law: The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications 
of Genetic Technology and Biomedical Ethics: The Road to Eugenics, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 491, 492 (1996).   
 110 See ENGS, supra note 105, at xiii; see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 202 
(defining positive eugenics as the promotion of “increased production of ‘geniuses’ 
and people of great talent, through encouraging more scientific selection of mates, 
and more breeding by the chosen few”). 
 111 See ENGS, supra note 105, at xiii; see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 202 
(“‘[N]egative eugenics’ was concerned with eliminating the least fit individuals 
through reducing or eliminating their reproduction.”). 
 112 Neumayr, supra note 34, at 1. 
 113 See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 114 Bowman, supra note 109, at 492.   
 115 Reilly, supra note 34, at 206 (“The nation’s first sterilization bill was introduced 
in the Michigan legislature in 1897.”). 
 116 Neumayr, supra note 34, at 3.   
 117 McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 200. 
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tives.”
118
  In 1927, in Buck v. Bell,
119
 the U.S. Supreme Court approved 
the states’ right to sterilize people with intellectual disabilities.
120
  In 
Buck, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “[t]hree generations 
of imbeciles are enough.”
121
 
In 1933 Nazi Germany enacted its own law (modeled after Cali-
fornia’s sterilization program) that led to the involuntary sterilization 
of more than 300,000 people, a majority of whom were feeble-
minded.
122
  In addition, between 1939 and 1945, Germany euthanized 
more than 200,000 mentally and physically disabled people.
123
  Dur-
ing the first half of the twentieth century, the United States and Ger-
many were not alone in implementing sterilization programs for 
people with disabilities; Denmark sterilized more than 8000 people 
between 1930 and 1954, and Sweden sterilized more than 2000 
people in 1948 alone.
124
 
With Nazi Germany having taken the science of eugenics to an 
unprecedented level, eugenics seems to have fallen to the wayside as 
a taboo subject.  Perhaps the fight against the Nazis in World War II 
and thwarting their attempt to create a master race made sterilization 
laws no longer palatable.
125
  The waning of the eugenics movement 
was reflected in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
126
 which although not expressly 
overruling Buck v. Bell, declared unconstitutional a law that would 
 
 118 Christina Cogdell, Smooth Flow: Biological Efficiency and Streamline Design, in 
POPULAR EUGENICS: NATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND AMERICAN MASS CULTURE IN THE 1930S 
217, 221 (Susan Currell & Christina Cogdell eds., 2006). 
 119 274 U.S. 200 (1927).   
 120 David Braddock & Susan Parish, An Institutional History of Disability, in 
DISABILITY AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE STATE OF THE STATES 1, 29 (Da-
vid Braddock ed. 2002).  
 121 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.  Justice Holmes’s preface to this infamous line is,  
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon 
the best citizens for their lives.  It would be strange if it could not call 
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser 
sacrifices [sterilization], often not felt to be such by those concerned, 
in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.  It is better 
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring 
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent 
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. 
Id. 
 122 Braddock & Parish, supra note 120, at 30; see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 
8, at 201. 
 123 Braddock & Parish, supra note 120, at 30.   
 124 Id. 
 125 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 815.  
 126 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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deprive certain individuals of a basic liberty—the right to procreate.
127
  
The Court acknowledged that “[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, 
may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects.  In evil or reck-
less hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the domi-
nant group to wither and disappear.”
128
  New developments in repro-
ductive technology and the law, however, have reopened the door to 
eugenics in the United States. 
V. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EUGENICS THROUGH DAMAGES AWARDS 
The courts’ and legislatures’ recognition of the torts of wrongful 
birth and wrongful life place an impetus behind a new eugenic 
movement.  As a consequence of holding physicians liable for the 
birth of a disabled child who could never have been born a healthy 
child, physicians will choose to err on the side of recommending 
abortions or abstention from conception to avoid potential liability.
129
  
This conduct will have the cumulative effect of eliminating the genet-
ically impaired.  This effect becomes inevitable as prenatal screening 
becomes more advanced and more parents take actions to ensure the 
birth of a normal and healthy child.  The government participates in 
this new eugenic movement in two ways.  First, the state engages in 
eugenics when its judiciary or legislature imposes this type of liability 
on physicians.  Second, a state engages in eugenics when it judicially 
or legislatively recognizes (i) that a child has been injured by its own 
birth to a life with a disability (but not injured if born without a disa-
bility) and (ii) that parents have been damaged by the birth of their 
unwanted disabled child (but not by the birth of an unwanted 
healthy child). 
Harriet McBryde Johnson, a disability-rights activist who died in 
2008 at fifty years of age from a congenital neuromuscular disease,
130
 
was aware of eugenic thinking vis-à-vis the disabled.  She wrote that 
“‘[t]he peculiar drama of [her] life ha[d] placed [her] in a world 
that by and large thinks it would be better if people like [her] did not 
exist.’”
131
 
 
 127 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 814–15. 
 128 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 129 See supra note 45. 
 130 Rosen, supra note 34.   
 131 Id.   
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The efforts of activists like Harriet Johnson have prevented our 
society from neglecting persons with disabilities.
132
  While her fight 
was one for accommodation for disabled persons, society seems to 
now be “in a disturbing situation: As our scientific powers to elimi-
nate disability grow, our acceptance of disability wanes.”
133
  There is a 
societal move to prevent the births of disabled children through the 
tools of prenatal screening and genetic testing and the exercise of 
one’s right to reproductive choice.  In 2005 the head of the American 
Association of People with Disabilities indicated that the use of pre-
natal screening to prevent the birth of disabled persons has placed 
society on a slippery slope toward “‘a new eugenics, and [he does 
not] know where it is going to end.’”
134
 
More subtle hints of contemporary, positive eugenic practices 
include prenatal-care programs that encourage pregnant women to 
eat well and abstain from alcohol consumption and tobacco usage to 
increase the likelihood of having a healthy child.
135
  The cumulative 
effect of the availability and use of reproductive genetic testing, how-
ever, together with awards of damages in wrongful birth and wrongful 
life suits, is a less subtle form of eugenics. 
From exercising choice and acting discriminatorily as a prospec-
tive parent to attaching a stigma and involving the state in that indi-
vidual choice, a backdoor eugenics movement has sprung.  Eugenics 
starts with control and choices—the control of factors that influence 
reproduction with the view to improving the species and choosing 
which traits should be inherited and which ones should be eliminat-
ed.  Discrimination is a natural byproduct of choice.  Some types of 
discrimination, however, are invidious because they involve prejudice 
and/or stereotyping.
136
  The discrimination involved in parents’ 
choosing which genetic traits they want their children to inherit is a 
natural and, currently, legal consequence of a parent’s right to pro-
creative autonomy.
137
  When the state, however, involves itself in the 
decision-making process—to a point where it legitimizes the disability 
hierarchy that society and parents have created and incentivizes phy-
sicians to recommend abortions or abstentions from conception 
 
 132 See id. 
 133 Id.  
 134 Neumayr, supra note 34, at 1. 
 135 ENGS, supra note 105, at xvi. 
 136 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “invidious discrimi-
nation”).   
 137 See supra Part II.A. 
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when risks of birthing disabled children exist—then the state is en-
gaging in eugenics, and this is wrong. 
The law accelerated a new eugenic movement by awarding dam-
ages in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.  For example, damages 
awards to disabled children and to parents of disabled children in 
wrongful life and wrongful birth suits, respectively, legitimize the 
claims that a person is harmed by being born disabled or by having a 
disabled child.  This legitimization is furthered in wrongful concep-
tion and wrongful pregnancy cases when a state refuses to award the 
same types of damages to parents who had unwanted healthy child-
ren. 
Maine, for instance, has enacted legislation that prohibits dam-
ages awards “for the birth or rearing of a healthy child” because the 
legislature felt “that the birth of a normal, healthy child does not 
constitute a legally recognizable injury.”
138
  The statute provides that 
no person may “receive an award for damages based on the claim that 
the birth and rearing of a healthy child resulted in damages to 
him.”
139
  The same statute, however, permits awards of special damag-
es “for the birth of an unhealthy child” resulting from a physician’s 
negligence.
140
  Most courts in the United States have similarly refused 
to award the costs of rearing a normal, healthy child in wrongful con-
ception and wrongful pregnancy cases,
141
 but will award certain costs 
in the rearing of unhealthy children in wrongful birth cases.
142
 
The state should not engage in this kind of discriminatory 
treatment.  The disparate treatment of disabled children and healthy 
children in similar negligence cases implies that disabled children (1) 
are to be less cherished than healthy children, (2) are harmful to 
parents, and (3) cause a legally cognizable injury to their parents.  
These negative implications are discriminatory, stigmatize the dis-
abled community, and breathe new life into a eugenic movement. 
Moreover, eugenics is unconstitutional.  “[N]owhere in Articles 
V and XIV of the U.S. Constitution, [nor] the Declaration of Inde-
pendence . . . is there any indication that ‘the lives of persons suffer-
ing from physical handicaps are to be less cherished than those of 
 
 138 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(1) (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. of 
124th Legis.). 
 139 Id. § 2931(2). 
 140 Id. § 2931(3). 
 141 See infra note 227. 
 142 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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non-handicapped human beings.’”
143
  No one is perfect.  “‘Each of us 
suffers from some ailments and impairments, whether major or mi-
nor, which make impossible participation in all the activities the 
world has to offer.  But our lives are not thereby rendered less pre-
cious than those of others whose impairments are less pervasive or 
less severe.’”
144
  Because no one can claim perfection, no one can 
claim that his life is more worthy than another’s. 
Furthermore, disabled persons have lives of value.  While Harriet 
Johnson suffered from muscular dystrophy,
145
 she did not let her 
condition become an insurmountable obstacle to living life to its ful-
lest as a lawyer and an activist for disability rights.
146
  She fought 
against the stereotype that disabled people live lives of suffering.
147
  As 
one commentator noted, what really oppresses disabled persons is 
not their own disability but the discrimination, stereotyping, and lack 
of accommodation that makes life as a disabled person much more 
difficult.
148
  And Johnson recognized that while “many things may be 
entirely foreclosed or more trouble than they’re worth, the possibili-
ties that remain are so numerous, so varied, so far beyond the capaci-
ty of one person to experience, so marvelous—that they might just as 
well be infinite.”
149
 
To have a preference for nondisabled children over disabled 
children deprives the latter of the same respect and protection that is 
accorded the former.
150
  Such a preference implies that disabled 
children are not equal to nondisabled children because they are va-
lued less.
151
  Many people hope that when they have a child, the child 
will not be disabled.  Whether this hope means that parents are deva-
luing and discriminating against children with disabilities, however, is 
not the issue.  The issue is the courts’ and state legislatures’ intention-
 
 143 Allan H. Macurdy, Commentary, Disability Ideology and the Law School Curricu-
lum, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 443, 453 (1995). 
 144 Id. at 454. 
 145 HARRIET MCBRYDE JOHNSON, TOO LATE TO DIE YOUNG: NEARLY TRUE TALES FROM 
A LIFE 7 (2005). 
 146 See generally id.  
 147 See id. at 253. 
 148 Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF 
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950–2000, at 374 (Solinger ed., 1998), reprinted in THE 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
MOTHERHOOD 231, 233 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008).   
 149 JOHNSON, supra note 145, at 257–58. 
 150 See HARRIS, supra note 17, at 88. 
 151 See id. 
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al or inadvertent condonation and encouragement of these parental 
preferences.  It well may be that when parents act on the hope that 
their children will not be disabled, it is a form of possibly invidious 
discrimination against the disabled community.  On the other hand, 
who can say it is wrong for deaf parents to want to have a similarly 
disabled child?
152
  Nevertheless, it is when government becomes in-
volved in these parental choices that there is cause for concern. 
While parents may legally discriminate in their exercise of the 
right to choose,
153
 when a state chooses to discriminate against the 
disabled, it must have a rational basis for such discrimination.
154
  Bias 
is not a permissible basis for discrimination by the state.
155
  Conse-
quently, the state may not treat disabled children differently from 
nondisabled children solely to “defer[] to the wishes or objections of 
some fraction of the body politic.”
156
  Private biases are outside the ju-
risdiction of the law, and so are parents’ procreative choices.  Indeed, 
“‘the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give [these biases] effect.’”
157
  
Thus, states’ awards of damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life 
actions are a rubberstamp of, and an impetus behind, society’s move 
toward a new eugenics. 
Although women in the United States are neither prohibited by 
law from conceiving when a risk of conceiving a genetically impaired 
child exists
158
 nor compelled to abort genetically impaired fetuses, 
tomorrow’s eugenic, discriminatory, and stigmatic effects of today’s 
damages awards are a very real threat.  Physicians, fearful of incurring 
liability in wrongful birth or wrongful life suits, will likely be more 
proactive in prenatal screening and recommending abortions.
159
  
Compulsory prenatal screening (or abortions), therefore, could 
“equally occur in the absence of [state] compulsion, if widespread 
genetic screening becomes accepted . . . as part of routine medical 
 
 152 See id. at 89 (“[Some] deaf people do in fact wish their children to be deaf like 
them . . . [because] there is a distinctive deaf culture which is in some senses better 
than that available to those with hearing.”). 
 153 See supra Part II.A. 
 154 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) 
(“[L]egislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
 155 See id. at 448. 
 156 Id.  
 157 Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).   
 158 Cf. infra note 226 and accompanying text.   
 159 See supra note 45. 
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practice.”
160
  The cumulative effect of this practice will have the same 
eugenic effect as if the law had directly compelled the abortions of 
genetically disabled fetuses in utero. 
The state may have a legitimate interest in ensuring that parents 
and disabled children recover the extraordinary costs of raising a 
child with a disability and living with that disability through adult-
hood, respectively.  The state, however, would rather these costs fall 
on doctors and their insurance providers, if not the families of dis-
abled children, as opposed to the state itself.
161
  The state does not 
want to support its disabled community.
162
  Thus, instead of enacting 
proper health care legislation to remedy the insufficiency of health 
care coverage for disabled children, the judiciary and the legislature 
seek to award damages against negligent doctors in wrongful birth 
and wrongful life cases to reduce the financial burden on parents and 
their children. 
The state’s inaction in redressing the inadequacies of the health 
care system has a domino effect.  The lack of coverage compels par-
ents to sue for costs to ease their burdens.  The lack of coverage then 
motivates the courts and state legislatures to ease the strain on the 
parents through awards of special damages.  This potential for liabili-
ty then incentivizes doctors to be proactive in preventing the births of 
disabled children.  The end result is the deliberate manipulation of 
reproduction by eliminating the births of genetically disabled child-
ren.
163
  And this becomes backdoor eugenics.  Thus, states should ex-
pand health care coverage for genetically disabled children so that 
the path to eugenics is effectively blocked. 
A. Damages in Wrongful Birth 
American jurisprudence vis-à-vis wrongful birth actions directs 
the value choices of parents by granting damages awards to a parent 
for the harm of having an unwanted disabled child.  Here, states are 
influencing, or implicitly dictating, a particular choice or result 
through their judiciary or legislative branches.  This jurisprudence 
 
 160 Ramsey, supra note 40, at 163.  
 161 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)–(8) (2000).  In enacting the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, Congress sought to assure the economic self-sufficiency for disabled in-
dividuals and expressed its displeasure in having to spend “billions of dollars in un-
necessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity” of disabled 
persons.  Id.   
 162 See supra note 161. 
 163 See supra note 1.   
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travels the same path that American courts paved in the early twen-
tieth century when they recognized and condoned sterilization laws 
targeting the enfeebled.
164
 
In 1967, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey first broached 
the issue of whether it would recognize a cause of action for either 
wrongful birth or wrongful life, the court, in refusing to recognize ei-
ther tort, nonetheless gave short shrift to any possible eugenic impli-
cations of allowing such claims: “Eugenic considerations are not con-
trolling.  We are not talking here about the breeding of prize 
cattle.”
165
 
The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, refused to recognize a 
cause of action for wrongful birth because it resounded in eugenics: 
The very phrase “wrongful birth” suggests that the birth of the 
disabled child was wrong and should have been prevented. If one 
accepts the premise that the birth of one “defective” child should 
have been prevented, then it is but a short step to accepting the 
premise that the births of classes of “defective” children should be 
similarly prevented, not just for the benefit of the parents but also 
for the benefit of society as a whole through the protection of the 
“public welfare.” This is the operating principle of eugenics.
166
 
The Michigan Court of Appeals further expressed concern about fol-
lowing the pattern of the early twentieth century, when courts (and 
jurists as respected as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes) did not have a 
problem authorizing forced sterilization.
167
  In reaching its decision to 
uphold the sterilization laws in 1927, in Buck v. Bell,
168
 the U.S. Su-
preme Court relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Joseph DeJar-
nette.
169
  Referring to the nefarious experiments of the Third Reich, 
Dr. DeJarnette said, “‘No person unable to support himself on ac-
count of his inherited mental condition has a right to be born.’”
170
  
That jurisprudential history implies that the judicial system is suscept-
ible to the views and biases of society.  The law, therefore, should take 
care to ensure that it does not affirm parents’ efforts, and possibly 
physicians’ efforts as well, to achieve the “betterment” of mankind at 
the expense of a minority group through wrongful discrimination.  
 
 164 See supra notes 113–121 and accompanying text.  
 165 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967). 
 166 Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
 167 See id. at 689. 
 168 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 169 See Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 690. 
 170 Id. at 689. 
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“The goal of reducing the incidence of genetic conditions is not ac-
ceptable, since this aim is explicitly eugenic; [medical] professionals 
should not present any reproductive decisions as ‘correct’ or advan-
tageous for a person or society.”
171
  Similarly, the legal system should 
not award damages to parents in a wrongful birth action on the pre-
mise that they have been injured by the birth of a disabled child.  
Doing so would affirm and condone the parents’ professed choice to 
have aborted the disabled fetus if they had been properly presented 
with the opportunity. 
Awarding parents damages for emotional distress in wrongful 
birth suits stigmatizes disabled persons.  Although recovery for emo-
tional distress is permitted and is appropriate in other tort actions, 
allowing it in wrongful birth actions sends the wrong message and is 
not an appropriate remedy.  In granting emotional damages to par-
ents in a wrongful birth suit, “courts assume all parents will expe-
rience ‘emotional anguish’ caused by the ‘apparent’ complete trage-
dy of living with a child with a disability.”
172
  Both causes of action, 
and wrongful life in particular,
173
 seem to follow this same distasteful 
logic.  The irrebuttable presumption of the law, however, should be 
that a parent loves his or her child unconditionally, regardless of the 
state of that child’s health.  Nevertheless, “[f]or all of this culture’s 
talk about ‘unconditional love’ of children, its tolerance of them is 
baldly conditional: It permits them to live on the condition that they 
possess wanted traits.”
174
 
As the Michigan Court of Appeals indicated, “a child should not 
be considered a ‘harm’ to its parents.”
175
  Disabled persons are still 
very capable of experiencing and providing love and affection to 
their family and living “full” lives.
176
  Any damages awarded to parents 
 
 171 COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY 15 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).   
 172 Macurdy, supra note 143, at 451.   
 173 See infra Part V.B. 
 174 Neumayr, supra note 37, at 2. 
 175 Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 681 (emphasis omitted).  For this reason, the court re-
fused to allow recovery even of “the customary cost of raising the child,” let alone an 
award of emotional damages.  Id.  This Comment, while in line with the premise be-
hind the Court of Appeals of Michigan decision, abstains from agreeing with the 
court’s view that no such special damages should be awarded because the health care 
system remains unable to address the financial needs of disabled children and their 
families.  See supra Part II.C. 
 176 See COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 171, at 54 (“[M]any people 
with disabilities lead full and productive lives and that society’s negative view of dis-
abilities is sometimes of greater harm to them than the disabilities themselves.” (cita-
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because they have been “harmed” by the birth of their disabled child 
echoes in eugenics.  A limited damage award would dispel those eu-
genic implications by ensuring that states are not legitimizing the 
claim that parents are harmed for being forced to rear a disabled 
child—their child.
177
 
B. Damages in Wrongful Life 
The eugenic implications are stronger in wrongful life than in 
wrongful birth suits.  At least in wrongful birth there is a loss of op-
portunity—the lost opportunity to exercise one’s right to terminate a 
pregnancy, which one cannot exercise without having all of the facts 
on which to base a decision.  One of the impetuses behind the physi-
cian’s duty to make full disclosure to the patient is a patient’s right of 
self-determination whereby “‘it is the prerogative of the patient, not 
the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his in-
terests seem to lie.’”
178
  Thus, while the plaintiff-parent in wrongful 
birth causes of action can, at least, claim the loss of a well-recognized 
right, the plaintiff-child in wrongful life cases cannot, since there is 
no recognized right not to be born.
179
  Like the wrongful birth tort, 
awards of damages in the wrongful life tort have eugenic implications 
because the damages are awarded for having to live as a disabled per-
son. 
To award damages in wrongful life gives legitimacy to the claim, 
“I should never have been born.”  It reflects negatively on disabled 
people to say that they have been damaged somehow or that they 
have suffered a harm in having been born.  To award a disabled child 
damages for pain and suffering for having been born is evidence of 
society’s inability to see value in the lives of people who have a disabil-
ity.
180
 
Disabled people have a history of being marginalized and deva-
lued in society.
181
  The legal system, by recognizing the wrongful life 
(and wrongful birth) suit, draws a distinction between healthy child-
 
tion omitted)); see also McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 203 (“Some patients with 
[late-onset] Huntington’s disease feel that the several healthy decades of life that 
they have is what really matters.”).   
 177 See proposal infra Part VI. 
 178 Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 509 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Canterbury v. 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
 179 See Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978). 
 180 See Macurdy, supra note 143, at 450. 
 181 See id. 
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ren and genetically disabled children; this furthers the marginaliza-
tion and devaluation.  These legal distinctions add fuel to the fire 
outside the courtroom because such distinctions are “then advanced 
to justify treating individuals with disabilities differently, [and] are as-
sumed to be natural ones, and, therefore, unquestionable.”
182
  The 
law thereby validates the disability hierarchy that society and parents 
have created and makes abstention from conception or abortion of 
fetuses with genetic impairments seem like the “right” thing to do 
when exercising procreative autonomy.
183
  The state’s endorsement of 
this disability hierarchy is a form of discrimination and results in eu-
genics. 
The Supreme Court of California intimated that “a reverent ap-
preciation of life compels recognition that plaintiff, however im-
paired she may be, has come into existence as a living person with 
certain rights.”
184
  Ironically, the plaintiff-child would not have such 
rights if she was never conceived or if she was aborted.  In Turpin, 
California correctly denied the child’s claim for general damages, in-
cluding pain and suffering, in part because “it is simply impossible to 
determine in any rational or reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff 
has in fact suffered an injury in being born impaired rather than not 
being born [at all].”
185
  In a wrongful life case, the child did not suffer 
the loss of “a life without hereditary elements” because this is some-
thing a genetically disabled child could never have.
186
  The child 
would claim that had the doctor not been negligent, his parents 
would never have conceived, or if he had already been conceived, his 
parents would have terminated the pregnancy.
187
  Thus the only con-
ceivable injury to the plaintiff in wrongful life actions is the opportu-
nity to not be alive at all.
188
  What many jurisdictions fail to consider in 
awarding general damages in wrongful life actions is that “the plain-
tiff has in fact obtained a physical existence with the capacity both to 
receive and give love and pleasure as well as to experience pain and 
 
 182 Id. at 451. 
 183 See id. 
 184 Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958 (Cal. 1982) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 185 Id. at 963. 
 186 Contra supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing prenatal-tort injuries 
where the child, but for the physician’s negligence, could have been born a healthy 
child). 
 187 See supra note 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 188 See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 964. 
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suffering.”
189
  And thus, a disabled child’s pain and suffering may be 
more than offset by the benefits of being alive in the world.
190
 
The recognition of wrongful birth and wrongful life claims is 
similar in some respects to Germany’s compulsory sterilization laws, 
which were enacted “for the prevention of progeny with hereditary 
defects.”
191
  The Nazis called a handicapped person a “‘[l]ife not 
worth living.’”
192
  The Nazis conducted their 1930s eugenics program 
by not only sterilizing undesirables but also killing about 150,000 
mentally and physically disabled innocent people—people whom the 
Nazi regime considered a burden on society.
193
  Granting damages in 
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits relays a similar message—that 
the birth of a disabled child has somehow damaged his parents and 
constitutes an injury to the child because allegedly a life with a disa-
bility may be a life not worth living.
194
  While Americans would be ap-
palled by a comparison of their modern society to that of the Nazis, 
the pre-birth screening and subsequent enforcement of wrongful 
birth and wrongful life actions evidences that some jurisdictions are 
sliding back into a eugenic abyss and going down a somewhat similar 
path as Hitler.
195
 
C. Summary 
Because eugenics occurs when a public or private entity attempts 
to improve or alter the physical or mental qualities of future genera-
tions, the courts’ current form of recognition of either of these caus-
es of action is a “less open and more subtle” expression, but nonethe-
less an expression, of our “intolerance for those who don’t fit the 
norm.”
196
  By awarding damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life 
suits to parents for their unwanted disabled child or awarding dam-
ages to the disabled children themselves, the government lends sup-
port to the claim that “‘disability is a fate worse than death.’”
197
 
 
 189 Id.    
 190 Cf. id. (suggesting that pain and suffering “must be offset by the benefits inci-
dentally conferred by the defendant’s conduct”).   
 191 McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 200 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 192 Dreher, supra note 99, at 022. 
 193 Id.    
 194 See discussion supra note 102. 
 195 See id.    
 196 Neumayr, supra note 34, at 1. 
 197 Id. at 2. 
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Contemporary attitudes indicate that despite recent efforts to 
accommodate those with disabilities, society continues to be unac-
cepting of such individuals.
198
  The Americans with Disabilities Act, 
“arguably the most important civil rights legislation enacted in the 
United States since the 1960s, reifies a national commitment to treat 
disabled persons as equals.”
199
  Society has witnessed increased con-
cern for the well-being and rights of disabled persons in the past dec-
ades.
200
  Yet society’s progressive movement of accommodation for 
disabled persons has regressed to the point where society and the law 
evidently indicate that a disabled person is better off not having been 
born at all.  This is not much different from saying that “‘a disabled 
person is better off dead.’”
201
  While it seems unlikely that state-
supported sterilization programs will be revived against disabled 
people in this country, eugenic thinking has nevertheless manifested 
itself in the context of prenatal diagnosis and the recognition of 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims.
202
 
VI. MITIGATING THE EUGENIC IMPLICATIONS OF WRONGFUL BIRTH 
AND WRONGFUL LIFE SUITS 
Many states have replaced the eugenic sterilization programs of 
the early twentieth century in the United States with eugenic abor-
tions at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first 
centuries.
203
  Obviously, the same state-directed eugenic programs of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—through which the legisla-
tures were authorizing involuntary sterilizations—are not in place to-
day, but the same values are equally present in this new “backdoor” 
eugenics.
204
  The eugenic implications can thus be mitigated by re-
evaluating the damages awards in wrongful birth and wrongful life 
causes of action. 
Society encourages responsible parenting.
205
  Some argue that so 
long as reproductive decisions are left to “responsible” parents who 
are trying to do what is best for their children and best for their fami-
 
 198 See Rosen, supra note 34. 
 199 Reilly, supra note 34, at 213. 
 200 See id. 
 201 Neumayr, supra note 34, at 2.   
 202 See Reilly, supra note 34, at 213. 
 203 See Neumayr, supra note 34, at 2. 
 204 See McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 203. 
 205 See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
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ly, eugenics is inevitable.
206
  If the costs of a disabled child’s health 
care are not covered by other means, then parents who learn that 
they are going to have a child who will likely cost them substantially 
more money than they expected may choose to terminate the preg-
nancy.  But if parents are assured that their child will be taken care of 
financially, they may choose to proceed with the pregnancy despite 
the additional emotional anxiety that may accompany the rearing of a 
disabled child.
207
  Furthermore, if adequate health care coverage were 
available for disabled persons during both their childhood and 
adulthood, huge damages awards in wrongful birth or wrongful life 
causes of action would be unnecessary.  Without those huge damages 
awards against physicians looming over the horizon, physicians would 
likely feel less inclined to engage in negative eugenics by recom-
mending abortions and abstention from conception for “at risk” 
couples. 
Yet even with a proper health care system in place to address the 
financial costs of living with a disability, the courts could and should 
award nominal damages to parents in wrongful birth actions.  Such 
damages will act as proper acknowledgment of what the parent has 
lost—the right to make an informed decision about whether to have 
a child.  Further, they may also serve to deter further negligent beha-
vior.  Most importantly, since awards of nominal damages will be con-
siderably less
208
 than awards for special damages and emotional-
distress damages, they will not incentivize doctors to excessively rec-
ommend abortions.
209
 
 
 206 McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 203. 
 207 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.  
 208 Typically, nominal damages are one dollar.  1 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES 
IN TORT ACTIONS § 2.04 (2009).  Some courts, however, have chosen not to limit 
awards of nominal damages to one dollar and have let juries award plaintiffs as much 
as $735 or $3000 as the circumstance of each case may dictate.  Id.   
 209 Other positive effects of such a result include increased proportionality to the 
level of culpability of the negligent physician, less of a windfall to the parents, and 
elimination of what would otherwise be an unreasonable financial burden for pre-
natal-care physicians.  Cf. Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 828 (Va. 1982) (discuss-
ing the drawbacks of larger awards to parents).  Moreover, removing the extra poten-
tial for liability for doctors should lower their insurance premiums, the costs of which 
would otherwise pass to the consumer-patient.  This should increase access to pre-
natal-care physicians.   
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A. Even Absent Legislative Action, These Torts Should Be Considered 
by the Courts 
There are competing interests in wrongful birth and wrongful 
life claims—the interest of autonomy in procreative decision making 
and the public’s interest in protecting disabled persons from discrim-
ination and a new eugenic movement.  Courts and legislatures have 
tried to negotiate a line that provides remuneration to parents who 
are saddled with the expenses of a disabled child but does not dispa-
rage the value of persons who are disabled.  Some courts have felt 
constrained from recognizing a particular cause of action without a 
clear mandate from the legislature.
210
  But this self-imposed constraint 
is unwarranted.  Courts that have refused to recognize a cause of ac-
tion because of a dearth of legislative authority are mistaken because 
wrongful birth and wrongful life are negligence torts, which is a 
common-law doctrine.
211
  As such, the determination of the scope of 
this doctrine is within the province of the courts.
212
  Courts need not 
defer to state legislatures to decide to what extent these causes of ac-
tion should be recognized.
213
  Moreover, courts should not wait for the 
legislature to resolve the issue because in the interim of waiting for 
legislative action there will be no resolution and no redress for those 
persons clearly wronged by the negligence of prenatal-care physi-
cians.
214
 
B. Issues in Line Drawing 
The legal challenge is where to draw the line to balance the in-
terest of “social obligations [to prevent a new eugenic era, in this 
case,] as against individual rights, and reproductive freedom and pri-
vacy as against the requirements of public health and welfare.”
215
  
Some courts have decided to tackle the difficulty of whether to rec-
ognize these causes of action and, in so doing, have considered the 
 
 210 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) (“Recognition of 
so novel a cause of action requiring, as it must, creation of a hypothetical formula for 
the measurement of an infant’s damages is best reserved for legislative, rather than 
judicial, attention.” (citations omitted)).   
 211 Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 829. 
 212 Id.; see also Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 
(E.D. Pa. 1978).  
 213 Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 829.   
 214 See Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., C.A. No. 98-2076, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 116, at 
*8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1999). 
 215 ENGS, supra note 105, at xvi–xvii. 
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relevant aspects of public policy.
216
  But with very few exceptions, 
these courts have not touched on the eugenic implications of recog-
nizing these causes of action.
217
  The judiciary and the legislatures 
should focus on these implications for the sake of public policy. 
While this Comment focuses on the impact that the recognition 
of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits has on the disabled commu-
nity, the arguments herein can also be extended to some extent to 
other types of discrimination, such as sex discrimination.  For in-
stance, perhaps in the future, parents who were seeking to have a boy 
and were told that they were having a boy but, in fact, had a girl will 
want to have the right to sue their doctor for wrongful birth.
218
  The 
question about whether the state has a sufficiently compelling inter-
est to prevent discrimination and a new eugenic movement against 
the genetically disabled is related to the question of whether a state’s 
interest in preventing a sexual imbalance in the population
219
 or 
gender bias
220
 is sufficiently compelling to either warrant interference 
with the constitutional right
221
 to decide whether to conceive and 
 
 216 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. 1978) (noting that any 
resolution of the wrongful life cause of action debate must consider public policy).   
 217 For those courts that have touched on this issue, see supra notes 165–167 and 
accompanying text.   
 218 See ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 33, at 362.  This may be a concern because 
“[b]oth prenatal testing during gestation and in vitro analysis of preimplantation 
embryos identify the sex of the fetus in most cases, thus creating the possibility of ab-
orting fetuses of the undesired sex.”  The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, su-
pra note 35, at 634. 
 219 See McGee & Magnus, supra note 8, at 203 (“In several developing nations am-
niocentesis is used to determine the sex of the fetus, with the goal of terminating 
unwanted females.  This has resulted in skewed sex ratios in India and China, just 
one example of what can happen if genetic testing and reproductive technologies 
are utilized in unregulated or poorly structured ways.”); see also Reilly, supra note 34, 
at 212–13 (“[T]here are states in India and provinces in China where it is relatively 
common practice to use medical technology and selective abortion to avoid the 
births of girls.  This, together with the once not uncommon practice in China of de-
nying lifesaving treatments to infant girls who are ill, has led to claims that as many as 
100 million girls are missing from the Asian continent.”). 
 220 The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 636 (“Sex selec-
tion is problematic because it implicitly fosters the value of one sex over the other, it 
confirms that sex is a governing factor in human behavior, and it treats gender, a ge-
netic trait, as a disease.” (footnotes omitted)).   
 221 Note that the governments of India and China have officially forbidden the use 
of medical technology and selective abortion to prevent the births of girls.  Reilly, 
supra note 34, at 212–13. 
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raise a child or limit the application of wrongful birth and wrongful 
life suits.
222
 
The Supreme Court intimated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that 
without Roe’s recognition of the woman’s interest in procreative 
choice, the government “might as readily restrict a woman’s right to 
choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further as-
serted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for exam-
ple.”
223
  The state should have a sufficiently compelling interest in pre-
venting a new eugenic movement directed against genetically disabled 
people to warrant a reevaluation of the judicial and legislative roles in 
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.
224
 
When will parents . . . be allowed to decide that their child is so 
‘defective’ that given a chance they would have aborted it while 
still a fetus and, as a result, then be allowed to hold their physi-
 
 222 The Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks of the Institute of Medicine would 
think so.  “The committee felt strongly that the use of fetal diagnosis for determina-
tion of fetal sex and the subsequent use of abortion for the purpose of preferential 
selection of the sex of the fetus represents a misuse of genetic services that is inap-
propriate and should be discouraged.”  COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra 
note 171, at 8.  The Committee also intimated that “reproductive genetic services 
should not be used to pursue eugenic goals,” id., and it recommended that “prenatal 
diagnosis not be used for minor conditions or characteristics.”  Id. at 105.  The Amer-
ican Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs also wants to limit 
the use of prenatal screening to serious conditions:   
[A]bortion or discard [of embryos] based on non-disease-related traits 
would be inappropriate.  Selective practices, such as sex selection, may 
result in lasting social harms . . . . Recognizing the potential for social 
harms, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research strongly discou-
raged the use of prenatal testing for sex selection . . . . 
     Selection to avoid genetic disorders would not always be appropri-
ate.  Abortion because of genetic disease is most understandable when 
the disease would have serious manifestations, such as with Tay-Sachs 
disease or Huntington’s chorea.  Conversely, selection becomes more 
problematic as the effects of the disease become milder and as they be-
come manifest later in life.  
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 638–39 (footnotes omit-
ted).  Thus, if such guidelines prove effective and parents are not entitled to prenatal 
screening for sex or minor conditions, then wrongful birth and wrongful life suits 
would not be available to them. 
 223 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992). 
 224 Interestingly, while China has prohibited prenatal sex selection, see supra note 
221, in 1994, China enacted a Maternal and Infant Health Care Law, which contains 
“language [that] has been interpreted to require sterilization or the monitored use 
of long-term contraception as a precondition of marriage if a person is determined 
by a doctor to be at risk for parenting [disabled] children.”  Reilly, supra note 34, at 
213. 
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cian civilly liable?  When a fetus is only the carrier of a deliterious 
[sic] gene and not itself impaired? . . . Should such issues be left 
exclusively to the parents with doctors being found liable for 
breaching their duty to inform parents of any fetal conditions to 
which they know or should know the parents may object?
225
 
While courts think they need to grapple with such questions, the dis-
cussion may be moot.  Although eighty-nine percent of Americans 
would support prenatal screening for severe genetic diseases, most 
Americans would not support genetic testing for minor defects or 
cosmetic reasons.
226
 
C. Drawing the Line Without Health Care Reform 
Even without sufficient health care coverage for disabled persons 
and their families, the eugenic implications of recognizing wrongful 
birth and wrongful life suits can be mitigated by reevaluating the 
damages that are awarded.  In wrongful birth actions, the damages 
that may be awarded should be limited to (i) general damages for 
emotional suffering only where the child suffers from an imminently 
fatal disease and (ii) special damages—damages in the amount of 
medical and hospital expenses incurred in connection with the birth 
and rearing of the child that are in excess of what the costs would have 
been to the parents if the child had been healthy.
227
  In addition, spe-
 
 225 Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1985).   
 226 ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 57.  Some, however, go a step further and argue 
that the State should interfere in a parent’s procreative autonomy to make sure that 
severely disabled children are not born: 
[Parents’] freedom of decision in this area should have presumptive 
priority in our moral and legal thinking.  Only in extreme cases are we 
warranted as a society in denying them access to the professional ser-
vices they need to realize their choices or in preventing them from ex-
ercising those choices.  These extreme cases are characterized by the 
following two features: (1) the likelihood that, relative to others in the 
birth cohort, the child will experience significant pain, disability or li-
mitations in life options as a result of avoidable genetic factors; and (2) 
the parents’ reasons for bringing the child into the world in this condi-
tion do not constitute reasonable or compelling grounds for respecting 
their choice.   
Ronald M. Green, Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm One’s Child Geneti-
cally, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 13 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
 227 The special damages should be granted only in the amount that exceeds the 
cost of a normal birth or rearing of a healthy child because in wrongful birth actions, 
parents do not allege lost opportunity to choose not to have a child at all but instead 
allege lost opportunity to choose not to have this disabled child.  It should be noted 
that in wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy actions, most courts do not al-
low parents to recover the costs incurred in raising a normal, healthy child to majori-
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cial damages could and ought to be awarded in wrongful birth and 
wrongful life causes of action for the costs of living with the disability 
once the child reaches majority.  In wrongful life, if costs of living with the 
disability through the age of minority were not already recovered by 
the parents in a wrongful birth suit, then these should also be 
awarded in the wrongful life suit. 
1. Special Damages Should Be Awarded in Both Wrongful 
Birth and Wrongful Life 
Since health care in the United States is still far from adequate, 
courts should continue to award special damages in wrongful birth 
and wrongful life causes of action to compensate the disabled child 
during both the age of minority and majority.  In the interest of fair-
ness, these onerous expenses should be recovered by the parents who 
may have wanted to abort the child for no other reason than the fact 
they could not afford a child with a disability.  Therefore, absent suf-
ficient health care reform, courts and state legislatures should adhere 
to good public policy and follow such jurisdictions as California and 
New Jersey in awarding special damages to parents and the children 
themselves for the costs of living with their disability beyond the age 
of minority, i.e., throughout their lives. 
Because health coverage for disabled persons still remains large-
ly inadequate, it is not surprising that parents sue in wrongful birth, 
seeking special damages for the substantial costs incurred in caring 
for a disabled child.
228
  “Some courts have been willing to overlook 
[the eugenics] problem in search of [financial] support for a dis-
abled plaintiff when adequate support for medical expenses is not 
otherwise available.”
229
  The rationale that courts have used to allow 
special damages is premised on “the conclusion that the mother 
 
ty.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Morris v. 
Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 188 (Okla. 1987).  The premise behind this disallowance is 
that “whatever damage plaintiffs suffered was more than offset by the benefit to them 
of having a healthy child.”  Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1971).  This is called the “benefits rule.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 
(1979).  The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the benefits rule is inapplicable 
in a wrongful conception case because “the value of the life of a child will always 
outweigh the customary cost of raising that child to majority.”  Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 
681 (citing Rouse v. Wesley, 494 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)).  The court also 
intimated that it would have the same presumption of value of the child’s life in 
wrongful birth cases, as well, because it would not “endorse the view that the life of a 
disabled child is worth less than the life of a healthy child.”  Id. 
 228 See supra notes 53–61 and accompanying text.   
 229 Botkin, supra note 30, at 273 (footnote omitted). 
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would have aborted the fetus and would thus not have had to en-
counter these expenses.”
230
  The courts that have recognized wrongful 
life claims have limited the damages awards to special damages for 
the same rationale.  For instance, California sought to follow what it 
considered to be good public policy in alleviating one’s financial 
burdens,
231
 and New Jersey, in recognizing the wrongful life tort, 
sought to “respond to the call of the living for help in bearing the 
burden of their affliction.”
232
  Thus, a court’s impetus behind an 
award of special damages is “not premised on the concept that non-
life is preferable to an impaired life, but is predicated on the needs of 
the living.”
233
  Courts will continue to feel this pressure so long as the 
uninsured and underinsured lack a sufficiently comprehensive health 
care program to help parents raise their disabled children or the ge-
netically disabled to live comfortably with their disabilities.
234
  The leg-
islature is in a far better position to remedy this issue because the leg-
islature can create a better health care system for disabled persons 
and their families.  Such state action has “substantial influence over 
whether children with conditions . . . have health coverage and how 
adequate that coverage will be to meet their care and treatment 
needs.”
235
 
Absent adequate health care, however, special damages for the 
additional medical and care expenses to be incurred by the parents 
during their child’s age of minority should be awarded to parents in a 
wrongful birth action.  The court must identify and compensate for 
only those damages “that flow from the denial of parental choice.”
236
  
If damages could be awarded on the basis of loss of parental invest-
ment,
237
 then this Comment would propose it, but such a calculation 
would likely be far too subjective.  A damages award to parents that is 
limited to special damages should act as sufficient deterrence to phy-
 
 230 Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Un-
masking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 284 (2005).   
 231 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982). 
 232 Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984), remanded to 502 A.2d 94 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 543 A.2d 985, 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1988) (dismissing only plaintiff’s legal malpractice count against certain 
defendants). 
 233 Id.  
 234 Botkin, supra note 30, at 273–74. 
 235 AAP Newborn Screening Task Force, supra note 54, at 421. 
 236 See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 770 (Handler, J., dissenting). 
 237 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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sicians while simultaneously addressing and mitigating the eugenic 
concerns implicit in recognizing the wrongful birth suit. 
Of course, large damages awards for the extra costs incurred by 
caring for a child with a particular disability may breed unfairness 
among parents similarly situated and is something that should be re-
medied by each state legislature.  The unfairness results when the 
costs of raising a disabled child are awarded to one set of parents who 
maintain that they never would have conceived or would have ab-
orted the child had they had the opportunity but are not awarded to 
parents who had a meaningful opportunity to make a decision and 
decided to proceed with the pregnancy—both sets of parents are still 
similarly burdened with heavy financial costs.  Again, this imbalance 
would be remedied with a proper health care system, which would 
cover the necessary costs for parents in either situation. 
Because it is illogical and unfair to permit only the parents to re-
cover the medical costs of the disabled child’s care and not the child, 
wrongful life actions should also be permitted so long as the health 
care system remains inadequate.  This will ensure that the disabled 
child may recover the expenses of his or her medical care upon 
reaching majority.
238
  After all, the child’s medical and other expenses 
related to his or her disability do not disappear when the child reach-
es adulthood.
239
  If the costs of medical care and other additional ex-
penses are recovered by the parents in a wrongful birth suit, such 
costs, of course, should not be recovered a second time by the child 
in a wrongful life suit;
240
 if the parents made such a recovery in a 
wrongful birth suit, the child, therefore, should only recover special 
damages limited to costs incurred during his or her adulthood 
through a wrongful life suit.
241
 
2. A General Bar on Damages for Emotional Distress  
Generally, damages should not be granted for emotional distress 
to either parents or the disabled child as a proximate result of the 
prenatal-care physician’s negligence in either wrongful birth or 
wrongful life causes of action.  This should be the rule even though 
“caring for children with severe disorders is often psychologically 
 
 238 See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983); see also Pro-
canik, 478 A.2d at 762. 
 239 Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id.; see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958–59 (Cal. 1982). 
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draining on parents.”
242
  Prohibiting damages for emotional distress 
would help mitigate the eugenic implications underlying a court’s 
recognition that a parent has been harmed by the birth of a disabled 
child.  Further, awarding any damages to an infant plaintiff for pain 
and suffering in a wrongful life claim is, in fact, eugenics; general 
damages, therefore, should not be awarded to a plaintiff in either 
suit. 
A court affirms the notion that disabled children constitute 
harm to their parents when it holds that parents who gave birth to a 
disabled child are consequently emotionally damaged and not merely 
economically injured.  One of the purposes in awarding damages in 
tort actions is to “give compensation, indemnity or restitution for 
harms.”
243
  As a result, awarding damages indicates that someone has 
been harmed.  Because harms should generally be prevented, award-
ing damages is akin to judiciaries holding that the birth of these 
children should have been prevented.  This is a eugenic goal—
seeking to prevent the birth of the unfit and to encourage the 
“[d]eliberate manipulation of reproduction with the purpose of 
creating superior offspring.”
244
 
The Supreme Court of Washington’s decision in Harbeson v. 
Parke-Davis
245
 is a great example of how a court may choose to consid-
er a disabled child to be a harm to his parents.  The court asked, “Are 
these developments [in medical science] the first steps towards a 
Fascist-Orwellian societal attitude of genetic purity, or Huxley’s brave 
new world?  Or do they provide positive benefits to individual families 
and to all society by avoiding the vast emotional and economic cost of 
defective children?”
246
  The court then chose to engage in eugenics by 
forthwith choosing to “recognize the benefits of these medical devel-
opments” and holding that “parents have a right to prevent the birth 
of a defective child.”
247
  The court also indicated that the legislature 
had previously adopted a policy to compensate a parent not only for 
economic losses but also for emotional distress.
248
  Then the court in-
timated that “[t]here appears to be no compelling reason that policy 
 
 242 The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 35, at 635. 
 243 1 NATES ET AL., supra note 208, § 1.01, at ¶ 2 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 901 (1979)). 
 244 BEYER & REDDEN, supra note 1, at 297. 
 245 Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).   
 246 Id. at 491 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 247 Id. 
 248 See id. at 493. 
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should not apply in wrongful birth actions.”
249
  Clearly, the court 
failed to perceive how the prevention of eugenics could be that com-
pelling reason. 
Tort law limits recovery for mental distress to those cases where a 
plaintiff suffers a legally cognizable harm.
250
  Since no cognizable 
harm has actually taken place in wrongful birth suits (except in cases 
where a parent has to watch his or her child die due to the congenital 
disorder),
251
 no recovery for emotional distress should be allowed in 
wrongful birth actions.  Arguably, the parent who was denied the op-
portunity to choose because the treating physician did not sufficiently 
inform the parent “suffers from the very harm not warned against.”
252
  
This statement implies that the harm that physicians fail to warn 
against in wrongful birth cases is the “harm” of having a child with a 
disability.  The court is making a value judgment by legally recogniz-
ing that parents who have a child with a disability are emotionally 
harmed while parents who have a healthy child are not (even if these 
latter parents did not want a child at all).  “A court has no business 
declaring that among the living are people who never should have 
been born.”
253
 
3. Exception: Damages for Emotional Distress Should Be 
Awarded to Parents in Cases of Imminently Fatal 
Disease 
In recognizing the harm and emotional distress that a parent has 
to endure in watching one’s child die, this Comment proposes that 
an exception be made in certain wrongful birth cases.  The emotional 
distress damages that should be permitted in wrongful birth actions 
are not meant to redress the emotional distress suffered by parents in 
having a disabled child they did not want.  Rather, they are meant to 
redress the emotional distress that parents will suffer as bystanders—
the emotional distress that results from having to watch one’s child 
die. 
This approach is synonymous with jurisdictions that have re-
jected the zone-of-danger limitation in bystander-recovery cases for 
emotional distress and have instead adopted the Dillon rule of fore-
 
 249 Id. 
 250 Berger & Twerski, supra note 230, at 285 n.137. 
 251 See infra Part VI.C.3. 
 252 Berger & Twerski, supra note 230, at 286. 
 253 Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (internal quota-
tion marks and footnote omitted). 
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seeability.
254
  The various formulations of the Dillon rule among the 
jurisdictions would require the following findings in a wrongful birth 
suit: a family relationship, death to the child, serious or severe emo-
tional distress to the plaintiff, and the death of the child being wit-
nessed by the parent.
255
 
Arguably, if the law permits an award of damages in cases of in-
tentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, then it could 
similarly extend this award to wrongful birth cases.  To provide con-
text for this issue, consider the following hypothetical: Amanda and 
Aaron are recently married and want to have a child.  Because they 
are of Ashkenazi Jewish decent, they are aware of the increased like-
lihood that they could have a child with Tay-Sachs,
256
 which is charac-
terized by, inter alia, loss of vision, mental underdevelopment, con-
vulsions, and a very reduced life span.
257
  They consult a geneticist to 
determine whether either or both of them are carriers for this inhe-
ritable disease.  The geneticist conducts the genetic tests and sends 
them to the laboratory for testing.  The lab technician, after working 
eleven hours straight, accidentally switches Amanda’s sample with 
someone else’s sample.  This mistake causes the test results to indi-
cate that Aaron is a carrier for the Tay-Sachs gene but not Amanda.  
Accordingly, the couple decides to proceed to have a child.  Amanda 
conceives and gives birth to a child with Tay-Sachs.  Further testing 
reveals that Amanda is also a carrier of the genetic mutation, and the 
parents file suit against the lab technician who was at fault.
258
 
If one of the foreseeable consequences of a physician’s negli-
gence in failing to diagnose a fetus with Tay-Sachs disease (a fatal dis-
ease) is that the parents will have to watch their young child die, then 
this is not necessarily distinguishable from a mother recovering dam-
 
 254 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 309 (2000).   
 255 See id. 
 256 Botkin, supra note 30, at 276. 
 257 Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958 (Cal. 1982). 
 258 Cf. Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 827 (Va. 1982) (stating that because the 
plaintiff-father’s sample to be tested for Tay-Sachs was mislabeled and mixed up with 
another father’s sample, the plaintiff-father’s test results were incorrectly reported as 
negative).  In Naccash, the court decided to recognize the tort of wrongful birth in 
Virginia and found the treating physician liable for the lab technician’s negligence 
based upon a theory of respondeat superior and awarded the parents damages for 
the costs of care and treatment of the disabled child, as well as damages for emotion-
al distress.  Id. at 827, 830–33.  The court did not decide the issue of wrongful life in 
Naccash.  See id.  Virginia, however, has refused to recognize a tort for wrongful life.  
Barnes v. Head, 30 Va. Cir. 218, 221–22 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993). 
STEIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2010  5:55 PM 
2010] COMMENT 1161 
 
ages for the emotional distress she endured because a negligent driv-
er fatally ran over her child in the street right in front of her.  While 
it is true that some parents, regrettably, will watch their children die 
as a result of accidents and late-onset diseases, these scenarios are dis-
tinguishable from wrongful birth situations.  The fact remains that 
parents in the wrongful birth fact scenario suffer by reason of the 
negligence of their prenatal-care physician.  The underlying premise 
in wrongful birth is that but for the physician’s negligence, these par-
ents would not have to suffer through the death of their child.  Thus, 
parents should be allowed to recover for emotional distress in wrong-
ful birth suits only where the genetic disease will cause the child to die at a 
very young age.  The rationale behind permitting an award of damages 
for emotional distress where the child suffers from imminently fatal 
conditions is that the emotional suffering clearly arises out of having 
to watch one’s child die and less from the inconvenience and disap-
pointment of having to raise a disabled child.
259
 
To provide further context for this issue, consider these two ad-
ditional scenarios: 
In the first scenario, Carrie and Carl are having their first child.  
They both have family members who have developed breast or ova-
rian cancer later on in life.  Unbeknownst to them, genetic testing is 
available for the genetic mutations of BRCA1 and BRCA2, each of 
which have been connected with up to an eighty-five percent risk of 
later development of breast or ovarian cancer.
260
  If the child is a girl 
with either of these mutations, she will have this risk of developing 
cancer, but a boy who is a carrier for either of these mutations can 
transmit them to his own children.
261
  Their prenatal-care physician, 
unaware of the couple’s family history, neither discusses these risks 
nor offers any testing of the fetus for these genetic mutations.  The 
couple has a healthy baby girl. 
 
 259 Furthermore, consideration must also be given to the concern that if the law 
permits recovery to parents for emotional distress, what would stop parents from 
suing for loss of consortium from each other.  Claims for loss of consortium may be 
too far removed to be considered within the realm of foreseeability.  The only per-
missible form of emotional distress that should be recoverable in wrongful birth 
claims is, as aforementioned, the distress in having to watch one’s child die at a 
young age; emotional distress, such as emotional strain on the marriage relationship 
that may ultimately result in the dissolution of a marriage, is too far removed from 
the doctor’s negligence to be considered proximate.  Prenatal doctors cannot be re-
sponsible for failed interpersonal relationships between married couples.  
 260 Botkin, supra note 30, at 267.   
 261 See id. 
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Soon after the birth, Carrie and Carl are informed about the 
possible inheritability of these genetic mutations that are linked to 
breast or ovarian cancer.  The couple is tested for the mutations.  
They also have their newborn daughter tested.  The results show that 
both Carrie and Carl are carriers for one of the two mutations, and 
their daughter also tests positive for that mutation.  Carrie and Carl 
dread the future prospect of having to watch their daughter suffer 
with, and possibly die from, cancer.  Carrie and Carl say that they 
would have terminated the pregnancy had they been given the op-
portunity to test the fetus for this genetic mutation and the results 
were positive.
262
 
In the second scenario, Dana missed her menstrual period and 
consulted her obstetrician to determine whether she was pregnant.  
After a urinalysis determined that Dana was not pregnant, the doctor 
prescribed Provera to her to induce menstruation.  He did not in-
form Dana about the potential side effects of the drug despite the 
fact that the Physicians’ Desk Reference (PDR)
263
 contained warnings that 
Provera could cause a fetus to suffer from congenital abnormalities, 
inter alia, if the drug were ingested by a pregnant woman.  A subse-
quent test indicated Dana was pregnant.  After she expressed concern 
to her doctor about any effects the drug could have had on her preg-
nancy, the doctor told her not to worry.  Despite the warnings in the 
PDR and other “maternal indicators,”264 such as spotting, Dana’s doc-
 
 262 Cf. id. at 293 (“No cases have been brought as of yet to explicitly raise this issue 
[of whether physicians must take a family history of cancer during prenatal care]. . . . 
[T]here is a general consensus that BRCA1/BRCA2 testing should not be offered in 
the context of prenatal diagnosis.”). 
 263 PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 2010 (64th ed. 2009); see also Physician’s Desk Ref-
erence Bookstore, Physician’s Desk Reference 2010, 
https://www.pdrbookstore.com/ProdDetails.asp?ID=9781563637483&PG=1&Type=B
L&PCS=PDR (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) (stating that the PDR, which is now in its six-
ty-fourth edition, “provides the most accurate FDA-regulated information on more 
than 2,400 prescription drugs”). 
 264 Maternal indicators are risk factors that act as red flags that indicate to the 
prenatal-care physician that he should disclose a risk to his patient: 
Accepted maternal indicators include exposure to drugs, irradiation, 
or infection; diabetes, mental retardation, or PKU; a familial pattern of 
inherited disorders; metabolic or biochemical disorders; known or 
suspected chromosomal abnormalities; multiple miscarriages or still 
births; infertility; consanguinity or incest; previous child with any kind 
of genetic abnormality; age over 35; possession of a recessive gene; and 
membership in an ethnic group at risk for a certain defect (i.e., Afri-
can-Americans and sickle cell anemia; Ashkenazi Jews and Tay Sachs 
Syndrome).  
Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 816 n.5 (N.J. 1999). 
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tor did not apprise her of the availability of certain diagnostic tests 
nor administer such tests during her pregnancy.  Dana gave birth to a 
son with bilateral limb reduction.
265
 
In both of these scenarios, damages for emotional distress 
should not be granted because the parents will not necessarily have to 
watch their child die.  Opponents may argue that drawing the line in 
this manner is arbitrary and that the law is ill-equipped to make such 
determinations.  This argument, however, is unpersuasive due to the 
fact that the law draws lines all the time.  The line here would be 
drawn at those children who are born with fatal diseases—such as 
Tay-Sachs (for which no treatment is yet available, and even with the 
best care, infected children die by age four)
266
 and polycystic kidney 
disease (also untreatable and incurable “and often causes significant 
mortality in the first month of life”).
267
  Deaf children and children 
 
 265 In a similar case, the Supreme Court of California recognized a tort for wrong-
ful life but refused to award general damages to the plaintiff-child for pain and suf-
fering—even if the plaintiff’s condition would have been more serious than deafness, 
the court indicated that it would not grant such an award.  Turpin v. Sortini, 643 
P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982) (“In this case, in which the plaintiff’s only affliction is 
deafness, it seems quite unlikely that a jury would ever conclude that life with such a 
condition is worse than not being born at all.”).  The court, however, did permit an 
award to the plaintiff-child for special damages to recover “the extraordinary ex-
penses necessary to treat the hereditary ailment.”  Id. at 966. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey permitted a wrongful birth action to go for-
ward for the parents of a child who was born with bilateral limb reduction, which is 
arguably not a severe disorder.  Canesi, 730 A.2d at 810.  New Jersey frames the 
wrongful birth issue not in terms of serious defects but any birth defects: “The viola-
tion of the interest in self-determination that undergirds a wrongful birth cause of 
action consists of the parents’ lost opportunity to make the personal decision of 
whether or not to give birth to a child who might have birth defects.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  The damages that are recoverable in wrongful life claims (as well as 
wrongful birth claims) “consist of the medical expenses attributable to the child’s 
birth defects.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Thus, presuma-
bly, if the medical expenses attributable to the defect in a wrongful birth or wrongful 
life suit are insignificant, then the award will reflect that fact in those jurisdictions 
(like New Jersey) that would permit suits for minor defects.  Note that the court af-
firmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the wrongful life claim be-
cause the “plaintiffs presented insufficient proof of a causal relationship between the 
drug and the defect that afflicts their son.”  Id. at 814. 
 266 Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders, Tay-Sachs Disease Information Page, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 
2010).   
 267 PKD Found., About PKD, http://www.pkdcure.org/AboutPKD/ 
AboutPKDPage/tabid/869/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2010); see also Becker v. 
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809 (N.Y. 1978) (noting that the parents’ first child af-
fected with PKD died five hours after birth and second child died at the age of two 
and a half). 
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with bilateral limb reduction or late-onset diseases would not fall into 
this carve-out for damages for emotional distress.
268
 
D. Drawing the Line Under an Adequate Health Care System: In Lieu 
of Special Damages, Nominal Damages Should Be Awarded to 
Parents in Wrongful Birth 
If a proper health care system were in place, the need for wrong-
ful life actions would dissipate, and only awards to parents for nomin-
al damages would be necessary in the wrongful birth cause of action.  
The Scots’ legal concept of damnum is instructive here since it neces-
sitates the recognition of wrongful birth actions even if a proper 
health care system were in place.
269
  Damnum is “the deprivation of an 
interest that the law recognizes as a legal interest.” 
270
  The invasion of 
a legal right and the loss that results is called injuria. 
271
  Here, the in-
juria is “the failure to advise that the fetus is unhealthy and, by exten-
sion, to imply that termination is not indicated; the damnum lies in 
being deprived of a legal right—that is, a[n] . . . opportunity for ter-
mination of a pregnancy.”
272
  Thus, a parent clearly loses something 
and suffers an injury by being deprived of her ability to exercise her 
constitutionally protected right to choose. 
As long as the law protects a woman’s right to choose whether to 
have an abortion and also recognizes parents’ autonomy in deciding 
what type of child they want to raise,
273
 then parents should be able to 
sue physicians for their negligence in either not conducting or negli-
gently conducting appropriate genetic testing, resulting in the par-
ents’ lost opportunity to make an informed decision.
274
  “If the moth-
 
 268 See supra note 265. 
 269 J.K. MASON, THE TROUBLED PREGNANCY: LEGAL WRONGS AND RIGHTS IN 
REPRODUCTION 86 (2007). 
 270 Id.   
 271 Id.   
 272 Id.   
 273 The Constitution provides, 
     Parents . . . have a liberty interest in the type of children that they 
conceive and raise.  In U.S. Supreme Court cases involving child-
rearing decisions, the Court has held that the determination of a 
child’s social traits is a matter for the parents to decide (even if state 
control arguably could produce a better child).  A strong argument 
similarly could be made that a child’s genetic traits should be deter-
mined by the parents rather than the state. 
Andrews, supra note 35, at 999 (footnote omitted). 
 274 See Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., C.A. No. 98-2076, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 116, at 
*9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1999) (“For those who can accept that abortion is a legal 
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er was . . . entitled to have her pregnancy terminated, and if she 
would have exercised that right, but was deprived of the opportunity 
to do so as a result of clinical negligence, those facts should found a 
sufficient foundation for her claim.”
275
 
To establish a cause of action in negligence, the plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant breached a legal duty that the defendant 
owed to the plaintiff, which caused the plaintiff to suffer a direct in-
jury.
276
  In the typical wrongful birth case, the physician has breached 
the duty of reasonable care that he owed to the parents.
277
  This duty 
necessarily includes the duty to inform the parents of certain genetic 
risks and the obligation to provide parents with reasonably accurate 
and complete information with which the parents could make an in-
formed decision regarding procreative choice.
278
  The right to have an 
abortion would be meaningless without sufficient information to 
make such a decision.  The breach occurs, for example, when lab 
tests are negligently mislabeled or test results are negligently inter-
preted incorrectly.
279
  When this breach causes parents to make a de-
cision to continue with a pregnancy rather than abstain from concep-
tion or have an abortion, as the case may be, the third element is 
satisfied.
280
  The parents have an actionable injury in that the physi-
cian’s breach of his duty to the parents deprived the parents of the 
opportunity to exercise their procreative choice—their right to 
choose.
281
  This is the direct injury in wrongful birth.
282
 
Injury is distinct from damages.
283
  “Injury” is the violation of 
some legal right, whereas “damage” is the harm sustained as a result 
of the injury.
284
  “Damages,” plural, refers to the amount awarded to 
 
choice for pregnant parents at pertinent times, there is no difficulty in finding room 
in the common law tort of negligence for claims of wrongful birth.”). 
 275 MASON, supra note 269, at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 276 Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 829 (Va. 1982).   
 277 Id.; cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash. 1983) (holding 
that the duty of a physician to provide sufficient information to parents during pre-
natal care is that of due care).   
 278 Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 829; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 487–88 (“The parents’ right to 
prevent a defective child and the correlative duty flowing from that right [to preserve 
that right] is the heart of the wrongful birth action.”).   
 279 See, e.g., Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 829. 
 280 See id.  
 281 Id. at 829–30. 
 282 Id. at 830. 
 283 1 NATES ET AL., supra note 208, § 1.01.   
 284 Id.  
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compensate for this harm.
285
  Generally, when the injury produces no 
damage (injuria sine damno) there is no cause of action in tort.
286
  
There is an exception to this rule, however.  Nominal damages may 
still be awarded where the commission of a wrong causes an injury 
but no actual damage or harm has been sustained by the victim.
287
  
While a plaintiff may indeed suffer some anguish from being de-
prived of her meaningful choice to have or not have the child (and 
such emotional distress is related to the conduct of the physician re-
sponsible for the deprivation),
288
 the emotional hurt and anguish that 
a parent suffers for having lost the opportunity to choose is neverthe-
less an injury that does not result in any real damage to the parent. 
Parents have been economically harmed when they have a dis-
abled child that they could have and would have aborted but for the 
physician’s negligence.  This economic harm, though, is the direct 
result of the state’s failure to properly enact adequate health care leg-
islation.  If the parents could recover the extra costs of caring for the 
disabled child during his or her minority, and the child could recover 
the same once the age of majority is reached, then neither party 
would suffer economic harm or loss as a result of the defendant’s 
negligence.  Thus, until proper health care is provided for disabled 
persons, courts would be wrong to turn a blind eye to the economic 
harm that has been caused by the negligent prenatal-care physician.  
Even in cases where there is no need to award economic damages, 
courts should still award nominal damages to vindicate the violation 
of the parents’ right to choose.  This award of nominal damages 
would serve the purpose of acknowledging that there was an infrac-
tion of the parents’ rights and that the doctor committed a wrong.
289
 
Despite the utility of nominal damages, several jurisdictions have 
refused to award nominal damages in negligence cases where the in-
jury is a technical one and no actual loss resulted.
290
  These jurisdic-
tions maintain that “[i]n a negligence action the right to be pro-
tected is the right not to be injured, if one is not actually injured no 
right has been infringed upon.”
291
  This argument, however, can be 
applied in wrongful birth suits to bar nominal damages because the 
 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Berger & Twerski, supra note 230, at 285.  
 289 Cf. 1 NATES ET AL., supra note 208, § 2.01.   
 290 See id. § 2.03.   
 291 Id.  
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deprivation of the free exercise of one’s right to choose is the true in-
jury in such cases.  The issue is the difficulty in finding that someone 
has been damaged as a result of that injury.  Some jurisdictions do al-
low an award of nominal damages in negligence cases when “the dis-
pute is not as to the fact of injury, but rather to the extent of that in-
jury or difficulty in proving the damage caused thereby.”
292
  Courts 
should follow this latter form of reasoning and grant nominal dam-
ages to parents in wrongful birth suits, thereby striking the proper 
balance between individual interests in reproductive freedom and so-
ciety’s obligations to protect the disabled population from a new eu-
genic movement. 
E. Summary 
Although some courts are hesitant to recognize either the 
wrongful birth or wrongful life tort without a clear mandate from the 
legislature, the judiciary is well equipped to make such a decision 
without legislative guidance.  While drawing the line in these causes 
of action can be difficult, it should still be done to thwart this new 
backdoor eugenic movement.  The eugenic implications of wrongful 
birth and wrongful life causes of action can be best impeded through 
the enactment of proper health care legislation that would cover the 
costs of living with a disability through a person’s childhood and 
adulthood.  If there were coverage, there would no longer be a need 
for the wrongful life suit at all and only nominal damages would need 
to be awarded in a wrongful birth suit to parents in recognition of 
their lost opportunity to exercise their reproductive liberty.  Yet even 
without such health care reform, the eugenic implications can be mi-
tigated by barring damages awards for emotional distress damages 
except in cases of fatal disabilities. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While there is a constitutional right to choose to terminate a 
particular pregnancy, each and every state should consider the eu-
genic implications in recognizing wrongful birth and wrongful life 
claims.  If state or federal legislatures continue to avoid addressing 
the inadequacy of the health care system for disabled children and 
adults, parents should have the legal right to recover the costs of rear-
ing disabled children through wrongful birth claims and children 
should have the legal right to recover the costs that they will incur af-
 
 292 Id. 
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ter they reach the age of majority through wrongful life claims.  The 
recovery of these costs is better public policy than the alternative—
i.e., saddling parents who tried to engage in responsible parenting 
with the huge financial burden of rearing a disabled child.  Until leg-
islatures redress the inadequacies of the current health care system 
for the disabled, both wrongful birth and wrongful life suits should 
be allowed and special damages should be permitted.  Further, a li-
mited damages award for emotional distress may be permitted in 
wrongful birth suits only in cases where the parents have to suffer by 
watching their child die at a young age. 
This approach is not the best solution because the recognition 
of these lawsuits stigmatizes the disabled community, legitimizes pa-
rental biases, and will likely encourage doctors to err on the side of 
recommending abortions to avoid potential lawsuits—thus throwing 
the eugenic movement into full throttle.  It also leaves both the par-
ents, who, after being properly informed of the risks of having a ge-
netically disabled child, chose to proceed with the pregnancy, and 
the child himself without means of compensation for their similarly 
extraordinary and burdensome costs.  These problems can be reme-
died if the legislatures correct the inadequacies of the health care sys-
tem.  The doctors’ incentive to recommend abortions will largely be 
removed if the lawsuits are rendered unnecessary by a health care sys-
tem that allows both parents and child to recover the full costs of car-
ing for their disabled child and living a life with a disability.  Moreo-
ver, the government will have removed itself from legitimizing the 
discriminatory practices in which parents engage while making re-
productive decisions.  The government can still acknowledge any de-
privation of the parents’ right to choose arising out of the negligence 
of the physician by awarding nominal damages.  This result achieves 
the best balance between the interests of procreative autonomy and 
closing the door to the government’s participation in this new eugen-
ics movement. 
 
